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The thesis interprets the caveat of Article 194(2) TFEU in order to assess the use of 
the Article as a legal basis for energy provisions provided by the European Union. 
The research subject is the Energy Title in the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union and the possibilities of the application of the legal basis provided 
therein. The purpose is analysis of the possibilities for providing of provisions within 
the scope of the caveat found in Article 194(2) TFEU with special regard to the 
possibilities of providing renewable energy legislation. The purpose of the thesis is 
on one hand to provide an overview of the premises for providing of energy 
provisions in the EU, and on the other hand to analyse the Treaty text in order to 
determine the legal basis for energy provisions. The ultimate objective is to 
determine the correct legal basis for renewable energy provisions, aimed at the 
mitigation of climate change.  
 
According to Article 194(2) TFEU, the practice of the shared legislative powers in 
the field of energy are restricted by the retention of certain energy matters within the 
power of the Member States. The wording of the caveat containing the restrictions is 
open to interpretation and has been a subject of extensive discussion. Many scholars 
have argued that the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU might obstruct decision-making 
in energy matters. This argument is contested, and the factual impact of the 
codification of the energy competences is analysed. The correct legal basis for 
energy provisions depends on the final interpretation of the text of the caveat and the 
level of significance of the effect of the measure. The use of Article 194(2) TFEU as 
a legal basis might not be the only option. There is a possibility that the legal bases 
within the Environmental Title might be used as legal bases for energy provisions in 
addition to Article 194(2) TFEU.  
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1.1 The vertical division of powers in EU energy law 
 
The European Union (EU) enjoys shared legislative powers with the Member States 
in energy-related matters. The vertical division of powers in energy matters is 
determined by Article 194 of the Energy Title (Title XXI) in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Energy Title determines the 
objectives related to the Union’s energy policy and provides a legal basis in Article 
194(2) TFEU for attaining the objectives. The use of the legal basis for energy-
related provisions is restricted by a caveat found in the second paragraph of the 
Article. According to Article 194(2)(2) TFEU, the Member States maintain the 
power to decide in matters concerning the conditions for exploiting their energy 
resources and in matters concerning the choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of the Member States’ energy supplies1, without prejudice to 
Article 192(2) TFEU in the Environmental Title.2  Article 192(2) TFEU determines 
‘measures significantly3 affecting a Member State's choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ to be subject of a special 
legislative procedure, leaving the choice of a legal basis for provisions affecting the 
Member States’ energy rights up to a certain level of signification open. Whether 
provisions with effect on the energy rights can be provided under Article 194(2) 
TFEU up to a certain level of significance or not, is unclear. The wording of the 
caveat, including the lack of a significance threshold for measures affecting a 
Member States’ energy rights, makes the Energy Title open to multiple 
interpretations. Because of the referral in the Energy Title to Article 192(2) TFEU in 
the Environmental Title, the Member States’ energy rights are not absolute. The 
European legislator’s process of providing provisions infringing on the Member 
                                                
1 The in Article 194(2)(2) TFEU granted rights for the Member States’ to decide in matters 
concerning ’the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ are hereinafter throughout the text referred to as 
the Member States’ energy rights. 
2 The restrictions in Article 194(2) TFEU will hence be referred to as ’the caveat’ of the Energy Title. 
3 Italics added by author. 
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States’ energy rights is however restricted and complicated and might lead to 
undetermined hardships. 
 
According to the caveat, the starting point is that the Member States retain the power 
to determine which energy sources to use and can make decisions regarding the use 
of coal, gas, fossil fuels, nuclear energy or renewable energy (RE) sources as well as 
solely decide on the Member State’s individual energy mix. This retention of power 
is however restricted and steered by the general principles and the secondary 
provisions provided by the EU. Secondary provisions concerning the promotion of 
renewable energy are especially restricting from this point of view.  
 
The direct reference to Article 192(2) TFEU might empower the Union to provide 
legislation affecting the energy rights attained by the Member States within the 
context of the Union’s environmental policy. If one Member State disagrees in the 
legislative process, and the process is halted, this might lead to struggle in reaching 
the environmental objectives, which depend on the greening of the Union’s energy 
policy. 
 
The achievement of the environmental and climate objectives set out by the 
European Union is highly dependent on reduction of the use of fossil fuels and the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.4  Since the EU cannot prohibit or restrict the 
use of certain energy resources in the Member States according to the caveat in 
Article 194(2) TFEU, promotion of renewable energy might be the pre-eminent tool 
in enhancing sustainable development and achieving the climate objectives. 5 
According to the TFEU provisions, the EU can, for example, not prohibit the use of 
fossil oil or even force the Member States to invest in the production of certain types 
of energy production.6  The method of providing new energy-related secondary 
provisions without infringing on the powers officially granted the Member States in 
                                                
4 See COM(2011) 885 final, Energy Roadmap 2050. 
5 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, para 1:” The control of European energy 
consumption and the increased use of energy from renewable sources, together with energy savings 
and increased energy efficiency, constitute important parts of the package of measures needed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions”. Bechberger in Morata – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. ix, has presented 
further arguments regarding renewable energy promotion to be seen as “the only strategic option for 
rapidly reducing European GHG emissions”. 
6 Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. 11. 
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the Treaty of Lisbon (2007/C 306/01) 7 (hence referred to as the Lisbon Treaty) 
requires complex patterns, political persuasion and legal will by the Member States 
and the EU institutions equally. The process of providing of provisions affecting the 
energy rights granted the Member States is still unclear in parts. Since neither the 
scope of the caveat in Article 194(2), nor the level of significance required in Article 
192(2)(c) TFEU has been determined as of today, contemplation on the possible 
effects of the caveat can only be conducted on a theoretical level and answers can 
only be provided on a hypothetical level.   
 
Both the vertical division of powers in relation to the determination of the level of 
significance required and the determination of the correct legal basis for certain types 
of energy provisions are interesting aspects to the interpretation of the Energy Title. 
Multiple aspects of especially the promotion of renewable energy in accordance with 
the two interrelated TFEU Articles are open to interpretation and determination, 
which makes the scopes of the Articles a versatile and interesting research objective.  
 
1.2 The theme of research and research premises 
 
The rapidly increasing climate change calls for appropriate instruments to enable acts 
of mitigation. Europe is the world’s second largest economy8 with over 450 million 
energy consumers and an annually growing energy demand by 1-2%. 9 The energy 
sector is world widely one of the largest contributors to climate change.10 Thus, 
actions of mitigation are prerequisite in the energy sector, and actions are especially 
welcomed on supranational level. The European Union is a leader in demand 
management, promotion of new and renewable energy resources and the 
                                                
7 Document 2007/C 306/01, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, Lisbon, 13 December 2007. 
8 European Commission Publications 2012: The European Union explained: Energy, p. 3. 
9 European Commission Publications: Eurostat 2006: Energy Issues, p. 2. 
10 Within the EU, the energy sector contributes to the greenhouse gas emissions with 27% of the total 
GHG production. Other major contributors are Industry (26%) and the households (19%), of which 
energy provisions regarding for example the European emissions trading system, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency also govern both fields of emitters. Agriculture, and services constitute of the 
rest of the GHG emissions in the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/cop21. 
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development of new, requisite technology.11 The promotion of the two latter is 
necessary in the pursuit of the EU climate policy objectives aimed at mitigation of 
climate change. With the right tools, including both policy tools and legislative tools, 
the EU can be a precursor and a role model for other regions and states in the pursuit 
of sustainable extraction of energy resources and sustainable energy use. The 
European Commission has appointed energy matters as one of its top priorities in 
2015, and has been ever so active in the field during the last years.12 Also the TFEU 
recognizes climate change as the main global environmental issue, in which the EU 
is expected to play an important role.13 The EU has provided extensive legislation in 
the field of energy during the last decade, and has thereby restricted the national 
legislator. Nevertheless, the EU as of today yet has no common energy policy. 
 
It is clear that the present energy measures are not ambitious enough to combat 
climate change14, and hence more ambitious measures will be vital if the Union is to 
reach its objective of reducing its Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80-95% by 
2050 compared to 1990 levels.15 The energy provisions introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty have caused fear among scholars that the adoption of future provisions aimed 
at climate change mitigation could result in a gridlock.16 Especially the by the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced Article 194(2) TFEU and its scope has been the object of 
extensive speculation and concern among scholars.17  
 
Reaching the objective of 75 % RE in final energy consumption in the year 2050 
(and 97 % in electricity consumption) will, under the current primary EU legislation, 
require unanimous decisions regarding extensive promotion of RE sources. The 
objectives including increasing levels of energy from RE sources leads to restriction 
of the use of certain other resources, which inevitably to a certain extent infringes on 
the powers granted the Member States. It is interesting to anticipate the extent to 
                                                
11 COM 2006 (105) final, p. 4. 
12 See COM 2015 (80) final and European Commission press release (18.11.2015): The Energy Union 
on track to deliver. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6105_en.htm. 
13 Article 191(1) TFEU. 
14 See e.g. Kulovesi – Morgera – Muñoz 2011, p 891. Substantially more ambitious measures are 
required in the period from 2020 to 2050 in order to secure the sustainability of the commenced 
measures aimed at climate change. 
15 COM (2011) 885/2 final, p. 2. 
16 See e.g. Peeters 2014, pp. 41-48. 
17 See e.g. Haralsdottir 2015, Angus – van den Marel 2015, Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 
2010 and Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012. 
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which the measures may affect the energy rights without the requirement of the use 
of the special legislative process (SLP), requiring unanimity, referred to in Article 
194(2) and proscribed in Article 192(2) TFEU. Even thought the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force in the year of 2009, the new Energy Title and its scope is an 
increasingly fruitful research objective the closer we get to 2020, when the 
effectuation of the current RE- directive comes to an end and new policies and 
provisions regarding renewable energy and the climate objectives need to be 
provided in some configuration. Before the CJEU determines the scope of the 
primary energy provisions, interpretation and contemplation of the Energy Title and 
the Article texts is equally meaningful.18  
 
According to Article 194(2) TFEU Member States have the right to decide on 
“measures affecting a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c)”. The 
thesis will process the aspects to the determination of the scope of Article 194(2) in 
relation to Article 192(2)(c) TFEU. The relationship could possibly be attended by 
the CJEU in a case regarding legislative infringement of the rights obtained by the 
Member States when the legal basis could be faulted due to a certain level of 
significance of the effect of the measure.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is two folded. The general purpose of the thesis is to 
provide an overview of the framework and premises for providing of energy 
provisions, which includes extensive background information regarding the 
idiosyncrasies of the energy sector and the vertical division of powers in the field of 
energy. The special undertaking of the thesis is to systematize and unravel the 
possibilities for promotion of renewable energy as well as to determine the correct 
TFEU legal basis for renewable energy provisions. The research questions are as 
follows.  
                                                
18 The European court (formerly the European Court of Justice (ECJ), post-Lisbon the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU)) has played a crucial and conclusive role in European integration with 
a special emphasis on the development of the field of the field of environmental law. The role of the 
CJEU has not been reduced, and the decisions have effects over the boundaries of different fields of 
EU law. For an overview of the effects the ECJ has had on the development of EU environmental law, 
see Jans – Sevenster  – Janssen 2007. 
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- What does the introduction of the Energy Title and the codification of the energy 
competences mean for future energy legislation, either fully or partially aimed at the 
environmental objectives?  
- Does the caveat in Article 194(2) combined with the technical requirements of 
Article 192(2) TFEU jeopardize the environmental and climate objectives set out by 
the EU or obstruct the decision-making process in energy matters aimed at mitigation 
of climate change, as alleged by many scholars?  
- Which are the technical issues at hand regarding the provision of environmentally 
aimed energy provisions, and how are the issues to be addressed? 
- How does the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU affect decision-making in energy-
related matters and what is the correct basis for renewable energy provisions?  
Because of the character of the issues at hand, no direct answers to the questions can 
be provided, and the answers to the research questions are provided on a hypothetical 
level. The hypothetical issues are then accompanied by equally hypothetical 
solutions.  
 
The theories and facts presented in this thesis will be applied especially in the sub-
sector of the promotion of renewable energy codified in Article 194(1) TFEU, which 
is particularly important for the EU environmental policy.  Focus will be on the 
environmental policy integration (EPI) and the promotion of sustainable 
development, which both consist of the holistic approach to environmental protection 
integrated into other sectors.  
 
1.3 Material, methodology and structure of the study 
 
The material of this thesis consists substantially of EU-material: Treaties, secondary 
legislation, judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the 
General Court (GC) and administrative decisions by the European Commission. In 
addition to EU material, the theme is analysed in light of different opinions presented 
in judicial literature in the field. The intent has been to choose, present and critically 
analyse literature representing multilateral opinions in order to present a versatile 
depiction. Especially post-Lisbon literature has processed the vertical division of 
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powers in energy matters widely, but the Union’s energy political development has 
mostly been presented rather technically and separately from other fields, whereas 
this thesis strives to address issues holistically and especially from an environmental 
aspect. The objective of this thesis is avoiding dissection of the separate fields of law 
and fragmentation, and instead striving to incorporation of the themes into a 
pluralistic totality, in the manner characteristic of environmental law. Thereby the 
analysis of the Articles at hand is not solely intended to be of technical character.  
 
The aim of this study is to provide an overview of the possible problems with the 
promotion of renewable energy related to the introduction of the Energy Title. The 
methodology of the thesis is dogmatic, since it strives to clarify, interpret and 
systematize the legal framework. The dogmatic task consists of interpretation of 
relevant official EU documents and most prominently of analysis of the relevant 
Treaty Articles, which is the main undertaking of this thesis. Secondary provisions 
have been used mainly to illustrate competence issues, and are not further processed 
because of the character of the undertaking. The approach to European Union energy 
law will be from the perspective of long-term commitments on combating the 
climate change taken by the EU. 
 
EU energy law and policy are unavoidably permeated by politics. In this thesis the 
focus will be on the legal aspect, from a somewhat constitutional point of view and 
thus primarily not on energy politics. The motivation to this derives from the focus 
on the codification of the energy provisions in the Lisbon Treaty. Due to the 
codification of the provisions, energy policy is no longer solely a general Union aim, 
but also a serviceable legal basis, and with that a ground for appeal. The EU 
objectives need legal bases to become competences, which the energy sector over 
time has developed. The problem with the Energy Title might not only be the 
framework, within which new legislation can be provided, but also the determination 
of the scope of the different interrelated provisions. The scopes of the separate 
Articles must be determined at latest if an appeal is raised based on the (level of 
significance) of a measure based either on Article 194(2) TFEU or an alternative 
legal basis. It is possibly at that point, when the CJEU attends an appeal due to a 
fault of the legal basis for a certain energy- or environmentally aimed provision, that 
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the codification of the energy competence might cause previously unseen issues. 
Possible outcomes of such a process is the mere clarification of the correct legal 
basis or the failing of a provision due to the lack of the required use of SLP in the 
legislative process.  
 
The post-Lisbon name of the European Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, (hereafter CJEU), will be used throughout the text. There appears 
to be no distinction between the use of the terms competence and power in the 
TFEU, and the terms will be used as synonyms in this text. The vertical division of 
powers is the focus on this thesis, and the horizontal division of powers is not 
considered momentous. The horizontal relationships between the different TFEU 
Articles constitute an aspect of greater significance than predicted due to the 
composition of the Energy Title.  
 
This thesis will ultimately analyse the possibility of promotion of renewable energy 
within the limits of Article 194(2) TFEU. In order to determine the extent to which 
Article 194(2) TFEU can serve as a legal basis for secondary legislation and national 
approximation, the boundaries of the caveat need to be determined. In order to do 
that, the thesis starts by providing background information in section 2. First, a 
historical background to the energy provisions introduced in the Lisbon Treaty is 
provided. The idea is to visualise the residuary of original, non-codified energy 
perceptions and the alternations to the unwritten perceptions codified by the Lisbon 
Treaty (section 2.2). Section 2 commences with an important aspect to the energy 
provisions, the relationship between sovereignty over natural resources and the 
climate and environmental objectives of the EU (section 2.3). The special character 
of energy matters will be enhanced, and the following section will present the energy 
policy of the EU (section 2.4). Sections 3 and 4 provide in-depth analysis of the 
energy provisions. In order to be able to analyse the scope of Articles 194(2) and 
192(2)(c) TFEU, fundamental aspects of the vertical division of powers in the EU are 
presented (section 3.2). The text then proceeds to processing the technical research 
questions by analysing the scope of the caveat (sections 3.3 to 3.4). After providing 
different possibilities regarding the interpretation of Article 194(2), the text provides 
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possible solutions to the different interpretation models presented (sections 4.1 to 
4.4).  
 
The thesis strives to commence from the general and progress towards the more 
specific questions related to the theme of research. Since the stand of the CJEU on 
the scope of Article 194(2) TFEU is yet (and possibly forever) to be determined, 
extensive contemplation and solutions will be presented. The text will finally 
summarise the findings of the research in section 5. 
 
 




The European Union has as of today not succeeded in developing a common energy 
policy, which appears to be the next large-scale objective of the EU. In the 1980’s 
the energy policy was concerned a ‘spectacular failure’19, but gradual progress has 
been made and as of today steps to foster a political climate, which supports a 
common policy, are visible. Today the development of an energy policy seems to be 
a priority of the EU institutions based on several communications from the separate 
institutions.20 The differences between the Member States’ energy sources and 
systems are a problem for developing a common energy policy. As will be illustrated 
in sections 3 and 4, also the uncertainties regarding the application of the primary 
energy provisions of today might be a holdback for developing a common energy 
policy.21  
 
                                                
19 Morara – Sandoval 2012, p. 1. The authors still regard the development of a common energy policy 
to be a ‘work in progress’ with an uncertain outcome and far from being a common policy (p. 3). 
20 See e.g. COM (2015) 80 final: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy. Nine months in to the process progress seems to have been made 
and the Commission is boosting the Energy Union-idea on official websites and in social medias. See 
also European Commission Press release: The Energy Union on track to deliver, 18.11.2015. 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6105_en.htm.  
21 For an extensive overview of the possible obstacles for developing a common energy policy, see 
Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010. 
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EU energy law has been developed since the 1980’s, but it was not until the Lisbon 
Treaty that energy was formally included in the EU policies. The introduction of the 
Energy Title with the energy objectives and a legal basis has been subject to vast 
speculations, but one thing that is clear is that the entering into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty has not slowed down the providing of energy-related provisions. A stronger 
legal framework should consequently mean progress for the providing of energy 
provisions. In order to provide background and present the premises for the energy 
framework, this section will illustrate the progress from the beginning of European 
Integration to the situation of today concerning European energy policy and legal 
framework. The policy issues are also illustrated by discussion regarding the 
relationship between the sovereignty of the national states over natural resources and 
the environmental objectives set out by the EU. 
 
This section strives to provide a background for the understanding of the in-depth 
analysis of the alternations introduced by the Energy Title. Presentation of the 
historical background and the idiosyncrasies characterizing the energy sector in 
combination with the presentation of the energy policy of the EU is a prerequisite for 
proceeding to analysis of the technical issues regarding the Energy Title. According 
to Talus, the interpretation of EU energy law is dependant on the bringing together of 
both history and policy in order to underpin the understanding of the fundamentals 
for the interpretation.22 The aim of the section is to provide a wide overview of the 
premises for providing of energy provisions in order to produce an answer to the 
curious research question of whether the introduction of the Energy Title has lead to 






                                                
22 Talus 2014(b), p. 7. 
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2.2 The historical background for EU energy law 
2.2.1 Energy in the beginning of European Integration – a driving force 
 
After over 60 years of European integration, the European Union with its Member 
States has not yet succeeded in the development of a common energy policy. It is fair 
to say that energy has been a driving force in European integration. Interestingly 
enough, it has also been one of the matters dividing the Member States the most. A 
coherent energy policy has never been established, and a coherent energy policy is 
regarded as one of the weakest achievements of the European Union.23  Not even 
when the EU energy policy was widely revised in the 1990s, primarily in the areas of 
environment and the internal market, was energy included in the formal competences 
of the Union. It was not until the Lisbon Treaty that energy formally was included in 
the field of EU policies, and the introduction of energy in the Treaties started a new 
era for EU energy law with the introduction of a legal basis and a clear vertical 
division of powers.   
 
With the establishment of the European Coal Organisation (ECO) in 1946 and after 
that the Organisation for European Co-Operation (OEEC) in 1948, the cornerstones 
of European integration consisted of Energy issues. The first Community 
establishment, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was founded on 
energy-related challenges in 195124, as was the European Atomic Community 
(Euratom) founded in 1957. Both of these lay the basis of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, with the main focus 
on the two primary energy sources of the time, coal and nuclear energy. No mention 
of environment was made in the establishing Treaty, neither was the word ‘energy’ 
mentioned. The Euratom and ECSC Treaties provide for a common policy in the 
respective energy fields, with delegation of powers exclusively to the supranational 
level,25 but in all other energy sectors energy policy and organisation was left to the 
Member States until the late 1980’s.  
                                                
23 Morata – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. 1.  
24 The ECSC Treaty’s underlying objective was the creation of a common market for steel and coal, 
the primary energy sources of the time. 
25 Since the ECSC Treaty expired in 2002, the Euratom Treaty is the only legal basis for a common 




Energy was thus the focus of Member State attention from the beginning of 
European integration. For the time, the ECSC and the Euratom Treaties provided 
sufficient common energy policies, but no progress was made in integration in 
energy matters even though new energy-related challenges arose. The Treaty of 
Maastricht included a reference to the energy sector in the list of fields of EC 
activities among policy areas like tourism and disaster control, a mere modest 
statement. Also, in contrary to many of the other policy areas in the list, the EC 
Treaty did not lay out objectives or procedures in the field of energy.  
 
During the years of 1957-1985 some Member States had ambitious national energy 
policies, but no unity was reached regarding a common energy policy. Member 
States were unwilling to delegate the necessary powers and submit the ‘energy 
sovereignty’ to the supranational level. It is apparent that it was the diverse 
contextures of the Member States’ energy structures that were the obstacle for a 
common energy policy, the same obstacle that still exists today. 26  The commitment 
in the different Member States in regard to their energy mix and the different 
structures of their energy industry varied greatly between the different Member 
States from the beginning of European integration27, and still does28. One important 
and clearly readable indicator is the energy dependency, but also the general 
structure of the Member State’s energy supply matters. The energy sector was 
largely state driven and monopolised from the beginning of the integration, but in the 
1980’s the energy monopolies and separation of the market based on state borders 
gradually started perishing. 29 After the year of 1985 the body of EU secondary 
                                                
26 Talus 2014(b), p. 17. Talus highlights the consistent work of the Commission for creating a 
common energy policy, commencing already in the 1970’s. The Member States’ reluctance to let go 
of the sovereignty over natural resources was the only holdback, since the legal framework for 
materializing a common energy policy already existed, at least theoretically. 
27 In the year of 1975 was for example the UK 0% energy dependent, in contrary to e.g. Italy with a 
close to 100% energy dependency. Talus 2014(b), pp. 17-18. 
28 The energy dependency of the Member States still varies greatly. Member States with an energy 
dependency of over 85% are Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Malta, whereas a less than 30% 
energy dependency was displayed in Denmark, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and the UK in 
2013. Denmark even displayed an energy dependency of -24%, which means that the country 
produced 24% more than its energy consumption. European Commission:  Member States’ Energy 
Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment, April 2013, p 12. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf 
(3.1.2016). 
29 Talus 2008, p. 642. 
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energy law started to expand, largely focused on internal market provisions and 
based on guaranteeing the fundamental freedoms (i.e. the free movement of goods, 
services, people and capital)30. The EC developed an energy policy in steps by using 
the general competences of the community, sparked by the communication “The 
internal energy market” provided by the Commission in 1988.31  
 
An energy law reform started advancing in Member State countries, and as no 
specific legal basis existed for energy matters on EU level, legislation was initially 
based on Article 9532 of the EC Treaty, which provided for approximation of 
domestic laws based on majority voting in the Council as regulated in the Single 
European Act (1987)(SEA). The evolving network of secondary legislation 
controlled the threat of disorderly development in a crucially significant sector of the 
European development, but the providing of provisions itself was disorganised due to 
the lack of a specific legal basis. The resistance of certain Member States also 
slowed the development down.33  
 
The next alternation of the EC Treaty in 1992, The Treaty of The European Union 
(TEU), integrated the ECSC and the Euratom Treaty into the new Treaty, but did not 
further address energy policy issues. The TEU introduced expanded legislative 
powers for the Union, and provisions on energy matters could after the introduction 
of TEU be provided based on co-decision, which is now called the ordinary 
legislative procedure.34 
 
2.2.2 Recent developments 
 
The shapers of the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe35 (hereinafter 
called ‘the Constitutional Treaty’) drafted an Article regarding energy:  
 
                                                
30 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 193. 
31 The internal energy market, COM (1988) 238, may 2 1988. 
32 Now Article 114 TFEU. 
33 Talus 2008, p. 643. The resistance was displayed for example as the lack of implementation of 
provisions, see e.g. case C-259/01 - Commission v France. 
34 Talus 2014(b), p. 18-22. 
35 OJ 2004 C 310/1 notice no. 2004/C 310/01. 
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“1. In establishing an internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and 
improve the environment, union policy on energy shall aim to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market 
(b) ensure the security of energy supply in the Union, and 
(c) promote energy efficiency and saving and the development of new and renewable 
forms of energy.  
2. The measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1 shall be enacted in 
European laws or framework laws. Such laws shall be adopted after consultation of 
the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. Such laws or 
framework laws shall not affect a Member State’s choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article III-
130(2)(c).” 
 
The text proved extremely controversial, and lead to many amendments. Some 
commentators argued the text to be a step backwards regarding the scope of EU 
competence, and some Member States feared the Article text would threat national 
control over national resources.36 The Article was re-shaped many times due to 
considerable political opposition, finally to be drafted in the form of Article 194 
TFEU, the form in which it finally was passed. The difference in relation to the final 
text of the Lisbon Treaty is not striking, which illustrates the sensitive character of 
the matter. The Treaty of Lisbon has overall been called the ’Constitution in 
disguise’,37 which is reasoned also based on the new energy provisions. Even though 
the “constitutional elements had to disappear”, as much as possible of the failed 
Constitutional Treaty was preserved in the Lisbon Treaty with the most prominent 
differences resulting in merely institutional and procedural alternations.38 
 
Despite the absence of a specific energy provision in the Treaties before 2009, the 
EU was active in the energy field and provided extensive energy-related legislation. 
Before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Green Paper39 and energy 
and climate package measures illustrate the Union already to have enjoyed extensive 
implicit competence in energy matters and policy instruments. The measures 
                                                
36 Hancher – Salerno in Biondi – Eeckhout – Ripley 2010, p. 370. 
37 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 263. 
38 Vedder 2010, p. 298. Vedder also notes that the Lisbon Treaty primarily concerns the institutional 
aspect of the EU. 
39 COM/2006/0105 final. 
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provided before the Lisbon Treaty show that the EC Treaty already was an adequate 
basis for ambitious energy-related measures aimed at climate change. The legal bases 
varied Pre-Lisbon, but most energy-specific agreements have been carried out based 
on implicit power, primarily on Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 TFEU) and 
gradually based on TEC Article 30840 (now Article 352 TFEU), which states: 
 
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.  
 
The permission to the extensive use of the Article in the field of energy was due to 
the fact that the use of Article 308 TEC was allowed where necessary, as long as no 
Treaty amendments would limit its application.41 Another frequently used legal basis 
for energy-related provisions was Article 175(1) TEC on the environment (now 
Article 192 TFEU). Clearly already the EC Treaty enabled the EU to realize 
structural changes and a considerable shift of regulatory power to the Union in the 
field of Energy. 
 
In 2005, the EU started preparing a new mid- to long-term strategy to confront the 
challenge of climate change, with the need to demonstrate that the Union was taking 
the Kyoto commitments seriously. Hence, the Commission commenced in preparing 
the foundations for a new energy policy, by introducing the Green Paper titled A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,42 with proposals 
on the implementation of the new energy policy. After the Green Paper in 2006, 
launched action plans, communications and packages have stressed the importance 
of the necessity of GHG reductions, integration and sustainability.  
 
                                                
40 Presidency Note of the 2000 conference of the Representatives of the Governments of Member 
States CONFER 4711/00, Brussels, 22 Feb 2000, p. 2. 
41 The use of the Article was allowed only when no other provision did provide the Union with 
powers to adopt the measure. Haghighi 2007, p. 72. 
42 COM (2006) 105 final. 
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During the development of the Union the focus has not been on a common energy 
policy, but rather on the principles of development of the internal market and energy 
security, both deeply rooted in sovereignty. The expansion of EU competences over 
the years has depended either on alternations of the provisions aimed at the widening 
of competences of other sectors or on the necessity in the action to reach certain EU 
objectives.43 The likeliest explanation for the recent developments of EU energy 
policy originates from the topical challenge of climate change. It is also evident that 
the patchwork of legislation suitable for providing of energy provisions with 
overlapping clauses caused a craving for a specific legal competence in the field. The 
EU is now at a stage where the necessary tools for achieving any objectives exist, 
and the execution hinges on political will. In order to enable legal clarity and 
transparency, as well as finally cause the energy provisions to be regarded as 
legitimate, the European leaders apparently considered the introduction of clear 
division of competences vital, and the Energy Title was introduced in the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
According to the Commission, the objectives set out to combat climate change are 
only attainable if the Member States speak with one voice,44 an idea mirrored in the 
Energy Title.45 Still, the fact that the Climate Package46 including the RE-directive 
was threatened to be vetoed by two Member States shows that the objectives still are 
not the same among all the Member States, which is set to cause problems in the 
future. The fact that energy now officially is part of the competences of the Union 
however brings with it that energy provisions can have more effect than earlier, 
which will be attended in section 3. 
 
 
                                                
43 Haghighi 2008, p. 464. 
44 COM (2008) 781 final, p. 3. 
45 This is visible furthermost in the reference to solidarity. Pielow –  Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – 
Talus 2012, p. 268. 
46 The new Climate Package consisted of four measures: the Renewable Energy Directive (RE-
directive), the directive on Emissions Trade System (ETS) , the ”effort-sharing”-Desicion with 
mandatory targets for emissions for sectors not covered by the ETS and a Directive with a legal 
framework for environmentally safe carbon capture and storage technologies.  
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2.3 National interests and climate objectives 
 
2.3.1 Environment and energy 
 
The history of energy and natural resources law in Europe has been strongly 
connected with rights to natural resources and property.47 States do not own their 
resources under international law, but are provided sovereign rights to exploration 
and exploitation of them pursuant to their own environmental and economical 
objectives.48 Regarding offshore resources, international law determines sovereign 
rights of the states to their continental shelves. States have been granted permanent 
sovereignty over their on-shore natural resources under international law 49, and 
hence, the states are free to determine for example which energy resources to exploit, 
as well as to determine national and private ownership over real property within the 
territory of the state. The Stockholm declaration of the United Nations determines 
the states’ sovereignty over their resources with the restriction of the ‘responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.50  
The Rio Declaration also addresses the issue, and states that in order to achieve 
sustainable development, states should reduce and eliminate unsustainable means of 
production and consumption.51  
 
Within the Union context, the Sixth Environmental Action Programme lays out the 
prudent use of natural resources as a postulate for sustainable development,52 and the 
Seventh Action programme highlights the need of environmental policy integration 
(EPI) in “all relevant policy areas” in order to reduce pressure caused by activities in 
                                                
47 McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 1. 
48 Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See more: Rønne in McHarg 
– Barton – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, pp. 64-65.  
49 Se eg UN resolution 1803 of 14 December 1962 (XVII): Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources.  
50 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 16.6.1972, 
principle 21. Per se a questionable restriction, since many a measure practiced by the national states 
has a negative effect on other areas than that of the national territory. 
51 Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration. 
52 Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying 
down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme.  
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other sectors.53 Ironically, the concept of natural resources is unclear in this as well 
as any other context.54 Concerning specifically energy resources, the EU gradually 
declared national sovereignty over the states’ respective national energy resources 
after World War II. 55 Even though the European Union through the TFEU or the 
former Treaties in no regard explicitly determines the control or ownership of energy 
resources, e.g. Guimaraes-Purokoski regards the energy resources clearly belonging 
to the ownership of the national states, on the territory of which the resources are 
located, based on TFEU Article 345 and Union Case law. 56 Article 345 TFEU states 
that ‘[t]he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership’, which as a starting point leaves the states to 
determine their conditions for ownership and property. The objective of the provision 
is regulation of the division of powers between the member states and the EU, and 
the objective is not interpreted to appoint the property rights of the Member States 
absolutely immune to application of Union law. Guimaraes-Purokoski highlights the 
restrictions on the right to decide over the natural resources consisting of the 
constitutive principles like the free movement of goods and the prohibition of 
discrimination.57 
 
According to Guyan – Kühne – Roggenkamp, the EU may govern the liberalisation 
but not the organisation of the energy sector based on the principles and provisions 
of the Treaties and the secondary legislation.58 The question raised is usually whether 
the Union should be concerned with the complex and divergent rules regarding 
exploitation of energy resources in the Member States. Member States’ regulatory 
measures in energy and property law are guided by among others the principle of 
non-discrimination and the rules of the four freedoms, against which for example 
                                                
53 Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 
on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our 
planet’. 
54  COM (2005) 670 final, Communication from the Commission, Thematic Strategy on the 
sustainable use of natural resources, p. 3: ”natural resources, including raw materials such as minerals, 
biomass and biological resources; environmental media such as air, water and soil; flow resources 
such as wind, geothermal, tidal and solar energy; and space (land area)” (italics added by author). 
55 See especially EC/98/101 The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy 
efficiency and related environmental aspects, Article 18. 
56 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, pp. 189-190. 
57 Ibid.  
58 The EU may for example govern the privatization of national energy companies. Guyano – Kühne – 
Roggenkamp in McHarg – Barton – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 337. 
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conditions for exploitation of energy resources cannot be taken.59 The trend in EU 
Directives regarding the energy sector is one of dissolving the traditional concepts of 
ownership, which has had a critical reception in the Member States.60  
 
There are different views on the conceptualisation of property rights in relation to 
national and international regulation, and of these, the probably most common 
conceptualisations are the natural law approach and the positivist approach. The 
natural law approach regards property as pre-political and therefore resistant to 
regulatory alterations, whereas a positivist concept of property rights sees property as 
a “social institution, created in order to perform social functions” and property rights 
created by state regulation. 61  Consequently, from a positivist point of view, 
reorganisation of property rights through regulation is legitimate. In a Union context 
this, nevertheless, is a complicated matter because of Article 345.  
 
McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden attend a proposed social division in the 
prospect of property rights, observing the restrictions of property holders’ authority 
and discarding an apprehension of the property owner having no obligations towards 
third parties. They show that a majority of modern time scholars accept the flexibility 
of property rights and the perception of property right as a social institution rather 
than a limitation on regulations 62, but the Member States of the European Union are 
hesitant to give up their sovereignty over resources more than they already have done 
so far. As an example of property law’s capacity to react, McHargh et al. provide 
two major influencers of EU law: the French code civile Article 544, which 
expresses ownership as ‘the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute 
manner’, provided, ‘they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations’, 
as well as the German Basic Law requiring property owners to act in a socially 
responsible manner.63 Also the nature of property law per se recognises limitations 
                                                
59 This is stated by the EC court in Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v Republic of Austria (1999) ECR I-
3099, point 38: ’although the system of property ownership continues to be a matter for each Member 
State under Article 222 of the Treaty, that provision does not have the effect of exempting such a 
system from the fundamental rules of the Treaty’.  
60 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 179. Among others is the negativity based on the customary 
tradition of state ownership in the energy companies. 
61 McHarg in McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 360. 
62 McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 7. 
63 HcHarg in McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 377. 
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on property usage by way of agreements, legislation and general legal principles,64 
which also is characteristic of the impact of EU energy provisions on the national 
legislative systems of the Member States.  For example Bosselmann regards 
territoriality, in its classic form, out-dated,65 which is an extremity to the discussion. 
 
What are then the reasons for limitation of the traditional conception property rights, 
according to which the natural resources are regarded as sovereign property of the 
national state upon the territorial land of which the resource are located? At least 
gradual acceptance of our duty towards the environment might lead to a point of 
common acceptance of the idea of ecological limitations and redefinition of property 
rights.66 Removal of traditional ownership is also motivated by a specific economical 
and public interest, which in the energy sector constitutes of enhancement of 
competition and ensuring of the functioning of distributional networks. 67  The 
economic re-organisation of the Union has required some impact on the traditional 
ownership and more alterations regarding the concept of sovereignty are to come if 
the objectives concerning the mitigation of climate change are to be reached. Today, 
sovereignty is commonly regarded as transformable and elastic.68 The practice of 
power in the European Union is described as post-sovereign, due to the depth of its 
infiltration in the traditionally national fields of power.69 Restrictions upon national 
property schemes may be imposed if serving public Community interests70 and EU 
common objectives. In the field of energy, certain areas are however left to the 
discretion of the Member States, intended to be strongly protected.  
 
                                                
64 Rønne in McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 62. 
65 Bosselmann 2008, p. 152-153. 
66 Bosselmann 2008, p. 131. 
67 Guyano – Kühne – Roggenkamp in McHarg – Barry – Bradbrook – Godden (eds.) 2010, p. 338. 
68 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 12-13. For a versatile discussion about state sovereignty in the 
European Union, see Mutanen, Anu: Towards a Pluralistic Constitutional Understanding of State 
Sovereignty in the European Union? – The Concept, Regulation and Constitutional Practice of 
Sovereignty in Finland and Certain Other EU Member States, Helsinki 2015.  Mutanen has also 
discussed the interesting concept of the death of sovereignty and the concept of beyond sovereignty, 
Mutanen 2009, pp. 394-417. Understatedly, Mutanen agrees to elasticity in the concept of 
sovereignty, as she in a Union context does not allege the death of sovereignty, which, in its 
traditional form, is the sovereign right to self-governance without interference from outside states or 
bodies.   
69 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 15. 
70 Based on community case law, the EU may restrict national regulation regarding property in order 
to promote the basic freedoms and the prohibition of discrimination, but not in order to e.g. ensure 
security of energy supply. This is stated in case C-309/96, Daniele Annibaldi v Sindaco de Commune 
di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio,1997, ECR I-7493. 
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The introduction of the Energy Title in the Treaties in a way closed the circle in the 
energy competence and natural resource debate, which has been on the agenda of the 
EU since the 1970’s. According to Sandoval – Zapater, the Lisbon Treaty exposes 
the certain unification of the Member States regarding the retaining of sovereignty 
over natural resources only as the EU in the last years had started influencing the 
policy area through institutional flexibility and alternative forums. 71 We can perhaps 
agree on the proposition that the text of the existing Energy Title is a codification of 
old ideas, originating as far back as from the 1980’s, as many scholars have argued.72 
 
The primary environmental EU law emerged in a similar way as the energy 
provisions, but in a more rapid progress. Environmental awakening happened in the 
1970’s in Europe. The European environment policy was primarily based on Article 
100 TEC and Article 352 TEC (now Articles 115 and 352 TFEU) in a similar 
process as the pre-Lisbon energy provisions were provided. In 1985 The Court of 
Justice for the first time recognized ‘environmental protection’ as one of the Union 
objectives.73 The Maastricht Treaty in 1987 brought on provisions specifically 
designed to protect the environment, after which the old legal bases rarely ever were 
used for environmental provisions. In 1993 the earlier written Article 2 TEC for the 
first time actually referred to the term ‘environment’, and referred to environment as 
an objective of the Union, and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 further improved 
the text considerably. The changes to the Environmental Title by the Lisbon Treaty 
were of merely cosmetic character, the only novelty was the referral to climate 
change as an environmental problem falling within the scope of EU environmental 
policy. Another addition to the environmental provisions by the Lisbon Treaty is 
within the Energy Title and its reference to environmental protection. 74  The 
connection of the Environmental Title to the referral to promotion of renewable 
energy in Article 194(1) can be considered a major improvement for environmental 
protection.  
 
Article 191 TFEU outlines the environmental objectives of the EU. 
 
                                                
71 Sandoval – Zapater in Morata  – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. 109. 
72 See e.g. Kuhlmann 2008, Vedder 2010. 
73 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 7. 
74 Article 194(1) TFEU. 
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1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following 
objectives: 
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, 
- protecting human health, 
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, 
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental  
problems, and in particular combating climate change. 
 
All of the environmental objectives are applicable to any other fields of EU law, and 
the objectives are also directly relatable to energy objectives. Acording to Jans – 
Vedder “Not only measures which result directly in the improvement of the 
environment fall under this objective, but also those which result in the improvement 
of the environment in a more indirect fashion fall within its scope”.75 Whether this 
means that any provisions aimed at the environmental objectives could fall under the 
scope of the Environmental Title is unclear to this day. 
 
The primary legal competence for environmental and environmentally related energy 
legislation was, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Environment 
Title with its Article 175 TEC (now Article 192 TFEU) originated in the SEA of 
1987. The Article provided a general competence for environmental legislation in the 
EU. The post-Lisbon competence of environmental matters is of shared character and 
the procedure for environmental legislation proscribed is the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Unanimity voting is required in certain fields of issues, according to 
Article 192(2) TFEU among others ‘measures significantly affecting a Member 
State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply’. The interpretation of Article 192(2) TFEU involves considerable 
problems; of which the problems connected to measures at different levels of 
significance affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources is 
of crucial meaning for this thesis. The problems related to the interpretation of the 
relationship between Articles 194(2) and 192(2) TFEU will be discussed in section 4. 
                                                
75 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 33. 
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2.3.2 The principle of integration 
 
The integration principle of the EU can be found in Articles 11 and 13 TFEU, and in 
addition, an environmental integration principle of specialised character regarding 
the Union’s energy policy can be found in Article 194(2) TFEU. The principle of 
integration consists of an internal and external dimension, of which the external 
dimension requires the environmental policies to be integrated into all other policies, 
fundamentally in order to ensure sustainable development. Virtually all public 
policies are related to the requirement of sustainable development and environment 
to some degree, and the field of energy is connected to a high extent. In relation to 
the environmental objectives, the integration principle is one of the most, if not the 
uttermost important principle in EU law. Secondary legislation must be interpreted in 
the light of the environmental objectives laid out in the Treaties, even in other fields 
than environment.76  
 
The principle of integration is often referred to as Environmental Policy Integration 
(EPI), a general concept boosted in the EU by the new Member States of 1995, 
Finland, Austria and Sweden.77  EPI was legally codified in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 in article 6 TEC. The above-mentioned states pressed for the principle of 
integration to be adapted more strongly into EU legislation, and as a result, a new 
article strengthening the principle of integration was inserted in the Amsterdam 
Treaty.78 The Treaty promoted the integration principle to a ‘general principle’. The 
result was the strengthening of the principle of integration, and in 1998 the Council 
of Ministers was requested to form strategies for environmental integration and 
sustainable development.79 EPI is seen as a way of enforcing the ambiguous concept 
of sustainable development.  
 
TFEU Article 11 reads: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in 
                                                
76 Jans – Vedder 2008, p. 496. 
77 Adelle – Pallemarts – Chiavari 2009, p. 13.  
78  Art. 6: ” environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of all the community policies and activities” ... “in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development”. Before the text in the Amsterdam Treaty, the principle of 
integration was in a weaker wording included in the Single European Act in 1987 (article 130r(2)). 
79 Adelle – Pallemarts – Chiavari 2009, p. 13. 
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particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” On EU level, the 
principle of integration affects policy-making and adoption of legislation in all fields. 
On every alteration of the Treaties, the position of the integration principle has been 
consolidated. According to TFEU art 6: “Environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of (all) Community 
policies and activities (referred to in Article 3), in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development.” In the case Greece v. Council, The ECJ ruled 
that the principle of integration is a binding obligation in EU law and that the 
environmental principles and objectives set by the EU must be integrated in to other 
policies.  
 
The understanding of the principle itself includes numerous uncertainties. Questions 
remain regarding what the object is, who the addressees are and which the criteria 
are for incorporating the principle. Doubts regarding the character of guidance and 
implementation (“must be integrated”) have been raised as well; is there a foundation 
for the EU authorities to restrict activities opposing or ignoring the principle?80 The 
question regarding the addressees is whether the principle is binding only on EU 
level and for Union institutions, or whether it is binding for Member States as well. 
The principle should nevertheless be interpreted under the apprehension that 
environmental policies cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be integrated 
horizontally as well as vertically in all areas with environmental impact.  
 
According to Jans, EU law must always be interpreted in the light of the 
environmental objectives of the TFEU. This he calls the “guidance function” of the 
integration principle.81  The clarity of the integration principle is thought to have had 
its peak during the Amsterdam Treaty,82 after which alterations to the texts blurred 
the lines of the clarity. Now, it is not entirely clear what must be integrated and at 
what level of strength. Can actions be reviewed in light of the principle? Can for 
example a directive or regulative measure be questioned based on infringement upon 
the principle?83 Case law has showed that questioning based on such at least in 
                                                
80 Veinla 2008, p. 5.  
81 Jans 2011, p. 1541. 
82 Jans 2011, p. 1538. 
83 Jans 2010, p. 1543. 
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theory is possible, as seen in the Bettati case, in which the lawfulness of Ozone 
Regulation 3093/94 was questioned in light of the environmental objectives and 
principles of the EC treaty.84 In the ruling, the Court noted that the institutions of the 
Union have a wide freedom of shaping the environmental objectives, and by that 
infringement can only based on heavy assessment flaws.85 
 
The principle no longer has the status of a general principle, but has become a 
provision “having general application.”86  According to Jans, the legal significance 
of this downgrading is marginal. Still, the justifiability of the principle is weakened, 
which makes the difficult task of the European legislator to balance sometimes 
conflicting interests even more complex”. 87 The balancing of different interests will 
thus probably be even more tortuous, and featuring the principle of integration 
superior to other, equal principles, will be as well questionable as difficult.  
 
The language of Article 194, stating that the energy policy shall be developed ‘with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment’ is softer than what the 
principle of integration in Article 11 TFEU requires. This, according to de Cendra de 
Larragán, raises the question about how the different fields of environmental 
protection and energy security can be balanced.88 Jans – Vedder’s comprehension is 
that at least all of the secondary legislation must be interpreted in the light of the 
environmental objectives of the Treaty, but uncertainty might remain regarding the 
other provisions of the Treaties. 89 
 
2.4 EU energy policy  
2.4.1 A common energy policy? 
 
If you look deeper into the functions of the Union’s energy policy, you will see that 
the main objectives of the EU energy policy are a) ensuring the functioning of the 
                                                
84 Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech Srl, Case C-341/95 1998, p 17–18. 
85 Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech Srl, Case C-341/95 1998, p 32-35. 
86 TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 7–17, 2008 O.J. C 115, pp. 53–55. 
87 Jans 2010, p. 1545. 
88 De Cendra de Larragán in Peeters – Stallworthy – de Cendra de Larragan (eds.) 2012, p. 43. 
89 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 27. 
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energy market, b) ensuring security of energy supply, c) promoting energy efficiency 
and energy saving and the development of new and renewable energy forms of 
energy and d) promoting the interconnection of energy networks. 90  The 
environmental dimension can be found in each of these sub-dimensions, but the most 
significant might be the promotion of new and renewable energy resources and 
promotion of energy efficiency and energy saving.  
 
The core areas of environmental actions in regard to energy measures are energy 
efficiency, the use of renewable energy, energy taxation and emissions trading.91 
Regarding environmental energy provisions there are some restrictions. Under 
current EU primary law, a member state cannot be forced to give up a specific 
energy resource. Even environmental measures at national level, which are 
endangering contribution to arbitrary discrimination, restrictions on trade within the 
EU or obstacles to functioning of the internal market, are to be removed.92 
 
In the TEU, sustainable development is referred to as a political objective.93 Article 3 
TEU states that the Union shall work for ‘the sustainable development of Europe’ as 
well as the sustainable development of Earth. Focus will hereinafter be placed on this 
sub-dimension of EU energy law, and an additional objective of the research if 
analysing how the Energy Title enables the principle of integration. 
 
The means of sustainable development in the energy sector are diverse. Many though 
highlight the importance of renewable energy94 and for example the CJEU has stated, 
that “It is”…“clear from Article 194(1)(c) TFEU that the development of renewable 
energy is one of the objectives that must guide EU energy policy”95 in the reduction 
of the detrimental fossil fuels, the key sources of energy used today throughout the 
                                                
90  European Parliament Energy Policy: General Principles p 1. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.7.1.pdf (3.1.2016).  
91 Talus 2014(a), p. 189-198. 
92 Case C-320/03, Commission v Austria. 
93 The preamble of the TEU, point 8 states: ”D[etermined] to promote economic and social progress 
for their peoples, taking into account the principle of sustainable development and within the context 
of the accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental 
protection, and to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied 
by parallel progress in other fields”. 
94 Se e.g. Talus 2014(a), p. 118.  
95Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten para 81. 
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world, which constitute the most detrimental environmental threat to our planet.96 
Fossil fuels, the hydrocarbons, are labelled the most detrimental for the environment, 
and safety concerns label the nuclear energy production. The EU seems careful as to 
take a stand in regard to the use of nuclear power as energy source, and the fashion is 
downsizing of the use of nuclear energy.97 The EU is about 77% dependent on the 
controversial hydrocarbons. The Union also imports around 54% of its energy share 
from outside of the EU98, which makes the EU 54% energy dependent.99  
 
RE promotion should be seen as one of the most strategic, if not the uttermost 
strategic option for rapid reduction of GHGs and the reduction of energy 
dependency. Enabling RE promotion requires appropriate legal framework as well as 
political will, which, in EU policy and legislative activity, go hand in hand. New 
legislation will have to be considered since the current Renewable Energy directive 
(2009/28/EC) (RE-directive) only imposes obligations up to 2020 while more 
ambitious climate change ambitions must be carried out after the year of 2020. The 
mandatory targets after 2020 are by the Council elevated to become, at some level, 
binding targets at EU level100  and the amount of renewable energy is to be 
continually increased in the EU. According to the European Council “An EU target 
of at least 27% is set for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 
2030.101 It remains, however, to be seen whether the political climate and provisional 
framework supports the objectives ambitiously enough. It is clear that the 
competence issues to some extent will affect the future provisions aiming at climate 
change reactions in the energy sector. According to Peeters “the current competence 
regulation in the TFEU for environmentally related renewable energy measures 
doesn’t facilitate ambitious decision-making”.102 Sections 3 and 4 will assess the 
                                                
96 Talus 2014(b), p. 176. 
97 See Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885/2 final. 
98  Eurostat: Energy productions and imports. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (3.1.2016).  
99 European Commission, ‘Key Figures’, Market Observatory for Energy, Directorate-General for 
Energy, June 2011, p 11. Based on 2009 figures. 
100 European Council Conclusions of 23/24 October 2014, EUCO 169/14, point 3. This can also be 
derived from European Commission Green Paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, 
COM (2013)169 final, 27 March 2013. 
101 European Council Conclusions of 23/24 October 2014, EUCO 169/14, point 3 
102 The fear is that certain Member States would require the use of Article 192(2) and disagree to the 
adoption of the measures. Peeters 2014, p. 62.  
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veracity of this statement by examining the primary energy provisions and their 
scopes. 
 
Provisions regarding the environment are to be based on Article 191 TFEU, with the 
aims of contribution to the pursuit of preserving, protecting and improving the 
quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational utilisation 
of natural resources and promoting measures at international level dealing with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems and in particular aiming at combating 
climate change. The renewable energy sources recognised by the EU are non-fossil 
sources such as wind, solar, biomass and geothermal power.103 The renewable energy 
policy in the European Union is governed mainly by the 2009 RE-directive, adopted 
as part of the climate and energy package, which outlines the policy framework to 
achieve a 20 per cent share of renewable energy in the EU’s final energy 
consumption by 2020.  
 
According to the CJEU “it is primarily at the production stage that environmental 
objectives in terms of the reduction of greenhouse gases can actually be pursued”.104 
The wording of the renewable directive states that “[t]he coherence between the 
objectives of this Directive and the Community’s other environmental legislation 
should be ensured”.105 Firstly, the wording chosen by the legislator enhances the 
apprehension that renewable energy promotion is an integrated part of the Union’s 
environmental equipment.  According to Sveens, renewable energy is stuck in the 
middle between being an environmental and an energy provision through Articles 
192(2) and 194(2) TFEU106, which is well-founded when analysing the above 
mentioned Articles and the text of the RE directive. Also the CJEU has pointed out 
that the overriding cause for the promotion of renewable energy is protection of the 
environment.107 Should then measures aimed at the environmental objectives but 
                                                
103 Definition provided in Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources “‘energy from renewable 
non-fossil sources, namely wind, solar, aero thermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, 
hydro- power, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases’. 
104 Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantio voor de 
Elekticiteits – en Gasmarkt para 98. 
105 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources para 44. 
106 Sveens 2014, p. 170. 
107 See case C-573/12 Ålands vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten paras 93 and 95. 
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concerning energy be based on the environmental primary provisions? The choice of 
the correct legal basis will be attended in section 4.3. 
 
2.4.2 Bold rhetoric, faint actions 
 
Energy policy and energy law must be considered separately, but these are also 
inextricable and neither can function without one another. Legal provisions do not 
function in a void, and especially when it comes to energy matters on EU level, 
politics play a crucial part. Secondary legislation relies on as well the Treaties as on 
policies and international commitments and the law is often a result of changing 
policies, forces and actors.108 Environmental and energy policies at EU level are 
results of political processes, described by Talus as ‘part dialogue, part bargaining, 
part law, and part invisible manoeuvring’.109 This makes the interpretation of EU 
energy law challenging. According to Talus, the policies and objectives influencing 
the field steer the interpretation of EU energy law towards a broad and policy-guided 
way of interpretation.110 
 
EU is well on tracks in meeting the targets of GHG reductions by 2020 set out in 
2009, 111  but the question remains as to what after 2020. The most recent 
communications from the Commission include the plan for an “Energy Union”,112 a 
concept called for by many scholars during the last years. The Energy Union plan 
signals a mutual approach in combining energy and climate objectives. The bold 
rhetoric has, although, as of today not been matched by actions. The requirement for 
the effectuation of the Energy Union would fundamentally require a new form of 
centralized governance, visualised by the Commission as “an integrated governance 
and monitoring process, to make sure that energy- related actions at the European, 
                                                
108 Because of this, EU energy law is a “constantly changing area of study: a ‘moving target’”. Talus 
2014(b), p. 6-8. 
109 Talus 2014(b), p. 188. 
110 Talus 2014(b), p. 7. 
111 A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, COM (2014) 15 final, 
p. 2, and an up to date report on assessment of the progress made by Member States: COM (2015) 574 
final, pp. 3-4.  
112 A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy, COM (2015) 80 final. 
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regional, national and local level all contribute to the Energy Union’s objective”.113 
Nevertheless, the visualisation provides no concrete application objectives. Despite 
the lack of concrete action, the plan at least signals the approach to the energy policy 
as a joined-up approach. 
 
In 2015, the Commission also presented a Communication with its proposals for the 
future of EU energy and climate policy after 2020 when the current legislation (the 
RE-directive) expires.114 The fundamental question running up to the proposal was 
the question regarding the legal abidingness of the proposals. The decision was a 
legal abidingness for the objectives, the same stance as the Council earlier had taken, 
but the abidingness proposed is of a different character than the RE-directive.  A 
40% reduction of GHG:s in comparison with 1990 levels by 2030 was proposed, 
with varying stands as to the abidingness and the targets by the Member States. The 
common approach by the Member States is that legally binding targets ease the 
target consecution, provided that reasonable time periods to achieve the targets are 
given. An active policy on infringements was also commonly desired, as this 
increases incentive.115 The Commission proposed a 27% overall level of renewable 
energy in the EU by 2030, although without setting out nationally binding targets, 
“thus leaving greater flexibility for Member States to meet their greenhouse gas 
reduction targets in the most cost-effective manner in accordance with their specific 
circumstances, energy mixes and capacities to produce renewable energy”. The 
“targets will be achieved while fully respecting Member States’ freedom to 
determine their energy mix. Targets will not be translated into nationally binding 
targets116.”117 This approach is clearly in line with the provisions in the Energy Title, 
but the effectiveness in relation to the environmental targets might be questioned. 
The Commission proposes that the Member States policies are to be individually 
decided based on the best match to their national energy mix, and for the Member 
States to outline national plans to reach the objectives. The share of renewable 
                                                
113 A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy, COM (2015) 80 final, p. 17. 
114 A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, COM (2014) 15 final. 
115 Consultation on progress towards the 2020 energy efficiency objective and a 2030 energy 
efficiency policy framework. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/consultation-
progress-towards-2020-energy-efficiency-objective-and-2030-energy (3.1.2016). 
116 Italics added by author. 
117 European Council Conclusions of 23/24 October 2014, EUCO 169/14, point 3. 
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energy is to be delivered “through clear commitments decided by the Member States 
themselves, supported by strengthened EU level delivery mechanisms and 
indicators”, but no practical examples of the EU level mechanisms is provided. This 
arises many questions.  
Experience from the current RE-directive has shown that binding targets provide 
good results, and if it proves that the free allocation of renewables shares does not 
lead to meeting the targets, providing new, binding legislation retards the process of 
reaching the objectives. This is the reasoning for providing legally binding targets for 
each Member State, which has proven functional, as the targets up to 2020 very 
likely will be met. The providing of binding targets is fruitful from an environmental 
point of view, but there are also arguments against the use of binding provisions. 
Even though the environmental objectives are more likely to be fulfilled, the binding 
targets of renewables have not always ensured “market integration, cost efficiency 
and undistorted competition”.118 If viewed from a purely environmental point of 
view, the use of mandatory targets is although fundamentally positive, and a positive 
indicator of EPI. 
In addition to the possible problems related to the providing of non-binding 
instruments, a 40% reduction of GHG:s is seen as a retreat from the objectives of the 
EU up to 2050, since 2030 is already two thirds of the way from 1990 to 2050. The 
Union’s objective up till 2050 is a reduction of GHG:s by 80-95%. The objective up 
to 2030, including objectives without binding targets, is among others referred to as 
“walk now, sprint later”119 by environmentalists, and more ambitious targets up to 
2030 are called for in order to prepare for the long-time target. If there, in addition to 
this, are no binding targets according to which the CJEU can impose fines on states 
for non-compliance and the EU is simply binding itself to reach the overall 
objectives, which is the higher body that can make the targets binding or impose 
sanctions for non-compliance? A possible higher body is the governance body 
related to the proposed Energy Union. According to the Council, the higher body 
will ”help ensure that the EU meets its energy policy goals, with the necessary 
flexibility for Member States and fully respecting their freedom to determine their 
                                                
118 COM (2014) 15 final, p. 4. 




energy mix”.120 This statement includes many curiosities. One: the respect for the 
Member States’ energy rights seems orderly. Two: the organisation of this higher 
body is inexplicit, as the statement only notices that “the governance system will 
integrate strategic planning and reporting on the implementation of climate and 
energy policies” and that “the governance system will be constructed on the basis of 
existing building blocks in climate and energy policy as well as on the agreed targets 
for 2030, and will include planning and reporting obligations”.121 No mention of 
supervision or imposition of obligations is mentioned. One cannot help but wonder if 
a reference to the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU has lead to the proposed overall 
target instead of the imposition of national targets. This should however not be the 
case. The competences for the Union to provide provisions infringing on the rights 
obtained by the Member States according to the wording of the caveat will be 
visualized in section 3. 
The following sections will analyse the legal provisions of the TFEU in order to 
visualize the coherence between the objectives and the legal framework provided in 
the field. In other words - how does the Union’s legal framework in the field of 
energy enable the attaining of the environmental objectives? 
 
 




The introduction of the Energy Title instantly resulted in many positive clarifications 
and minor alternations.122 One, the codification of the vertical division of powers 
between the Union and the Member states clarified many competence issues, which 
existed due to the lack of a codification of the status quo. Two, the introduction of a 
                                                
120 Council conclusions on the governance system of the European Union. Press release 869/15, 
26.11.2015, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/26-
conclusions-energy-union-governance/ (3.1.2016). 
121 Italics added by author. 
122 For example Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012 regard the new Energy Title as a 
grand strenghtening of the competences of the European Union. Others, like Vedder 2010, are more 
modest and regard the Energy Title solely to be a codification of the earlier existed status quo. 
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specific legal basis for energy provisions provided energy provisions with legality. 
Three, the specification of the energy objectives placed energy in a previous 
undetermined context. The context now determined is the context of the internal 
market and the field of environmental policy and provisions. The definition of the 
context has although left many questions unanswered, inter alia regarding the 
possible alternations to the vertical division of powers, the legal basis for promotion 
of renewable energy and the external competence of the EU. 
 
This section will commence by explaining the premises for the vertical division of 
powers and the hierarchical division of the normative framework of the Union. The 
technical alternation introduced by the Energy Title will be presented, as well as the 
legal basis provided for energy provisions within Article 194(2) TFEU. In and after 
presenting the premises for providing of energy provisions, the section strives to 
address the question of what the consequences of the codification of the energy 
provisions might be, and what the changes brought on by the primary provisions are. 
The section will also initiate the discussion on how the caveat in Article 194(2) will 
affect the decision-making process in energy-related legislative matters. 
 
3.2 The division of powers in the energy sector 
3.2.1 The essentials for the vertical division of powers in the energy sector 
 
The vertical division of powers intends the division of powers between the EU and 
the Member States. In the vertical division, some fields of power are left with the 
Member States, as some are granted the EU institutions. According to Article 4(2)(i) 
TFEU Member States “exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not 
exercised its competence” and according to Article 2(2) TFEU, Member States can 
develop their own policies, taking the principle of loyal cooperation into account. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the limits of the Union competence in energy matters were 
vaguely determined, if at all. To determine the competence limits before Lisbon, case 
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law and legislation pursuant to the energy policies were key terms to the real scope 
of the competence matter at hand.123  
 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, as a starting point, all competences belong to the 
separate states, and the EU can enjoy only explicit competences mentioned in the 
Treaties.124 The competences of the Union have increased significantly over the 
years. The competence for the EU can be either shared or exclusive, and the states 
can also enjoy exclusive competence, which is the supposition. 125  Secondary 
provisions given by the Union must be based on explicit or shared competence bases, 
and the Member States cannot provide provisions in areas where explicit Union 
provisions exists, nor provide provisions contravening the provisions provided by the 
Union. In a EU-context the delegation of power to the Union is called attributed 
power.126  Attribution of power is confirmed in the Treaties, and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed the attribution of power in an early 
stage.127 In addition to the attribution of powers, the Lisbon Treaty also contains 
provisions on when the competences should be exercised. Following the subsidiarity 
principle, the Union cannot act beyond measures necessary to reach the objectives in 
the Treaties128, and the need of a legal basis is a necessary requirement, sine qua 
non.129 The legal basis can be found expressly in the Treaty text (explicit power) or 
be implied from Treaty texts or from secondary legislation based on the primary 
provisions (implicit power).130 Thereby also secondary legislation can determine the 
attribution of power, and primary legislation solely does not determine it. An EU-
level energy-specific instrument consequently requires 1) a legal basis and 2) 
compliance with existing (secondary) EU law. The providing of regulation within the 
field of energy has traditionally been regarded belonging to the sovereignty of the 
Member States. The Member States function as legislators of the Union through their 
                                                
123 Graig – de Búrca 2011, p. 73. 
124 Article 5 TEU. 
125 Articles 3-6 TFEU. 
126 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 19. The attribution of powers concerns both the internal and the 
external competences of the Union.  
127 Case 6/64 Costa v. Enel, judgement of 15.7.1964. 
128 Talus 2015, p. 6. 
129 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 22. 
130 Haghighi 2008, p. 464. An example of implicit power practiced by the Union is the former 
frequent use of the EC Article 308 for energy provisions, according to which the Union could practise 
its powers for harmonisation purposes in field where a specific legal basis did not exist. 
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ministers and as members of the Council of the European Union, whereby the 
Member States cannot be regarded as passive recipients to Union provisions. 
 
Energy is, based of Article 4(1) TFEU one of the 11 areas of shared competences 
together with e.g. the internal market, social policy, environment, trans-European 
networks and transport. The presumption in areas of shared competence is that 
decisions are to be taken at Member State level where the Member States shall 
‘exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence’ or if it has ‘decided to cease exercising its competence’.131 Hence, in 
reality, the areas of shared competence enjoy various divisions of powers due to the 
already practised powers by the Union. The precise determination of shared 
competence within each area can only be achieved by consideration of the detailed 
rules governing the areas and with consideration of the secondary legislation in the 
area. According to Article 2(6) TFEU “the scope of and arrangements for exercising 
the Union’s competences shall be determined by the provisions of the Treaties 
relating to each area”. The Member States lose their competence if the EU has 
exercised its power in a certain question. Areas, which are to remain in the explicit 
competences of the Member States, are better being protected by Articles like the 
one found in 194(2) TFEU, which in theory restrict the competences of the Union. 
Provisions regarding the energy sector have primarily been provided before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the Energy Title and the 
secondary legislation must be of conclusive value, at least to some extent. 
 
One of the most significant alterations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty from an 
environmental perspective is a definition of the competences of the EU and the 
division of powers between the Member States and the Union in energy matters.132 In 
the EC Treaty, there was no specific legal basis for the energy sector, and energy 
matters were included in the Treaty, as they were not specifically excluded from it. 
                                                
131 De Cendra de Larragán 2011, p. 155-156. 
132 Before the Lisbon Treaty the EU institutions arguably enjoyed extensive competence in energy 
matters based on the Third Energy Package and the existing body of secondary legislation. Whether 
the specific energy provisions brought clarity or had any impact on EU the division of powers in the 
field of energy is debated. For further discussion on the debated alternation of division of powers see 
e.g. Hancher – Salerno in Biondi – Eeckhout – Ripley 2012, pp. 367-403 and Haralsdottír 2014. 
Guimaraes-Purokoski regards the Energy Title to be of merely clarifying character, Guimaraes-
Purokoski 2009, p. 194. 
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Different forms of energy were treated as any other objects under the provisions 
regarding the free movement of goods.133 With the Lisbon Treaty, specific provisions 
concerning the energy sector were introduced in a new Title on Union Energy policy, 
Title XXI, consisting of a single Article. Energy-specific secondary legislation 
containing sector-specific rules for exploitation of energy resources legislation did 
exist before the Lisbon Treaty, but the codification of primary law due to the Lisbon 
Treaty was eligible regarding the complex matters in the field of energy. Before the 
specific energy provision in the Lisbon Treaty, a large amount of provisions were 
used as base for energy legislation, whereas the room for action was broad but 
vaguely determined.  
 
It is clear that environment is taken increasingly into account energy provisions 
provided in the most recent years by the Union.134 In addition to he Union policies, 
international provisions also bind the EU legislator. The principles of subsidiarity, 
conferral of powers and the principle of proportionality also govern the Union 
competences.135 
 
3.2.2 The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
 
Article 5 TEU determines the principle of proportionality. The fourth paragraph 
states,  “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”.  Every 
measure is to be evaluated in relation to its effects, and all actions are to be held at a 
minimum in order to be proportionate in relation to the measure at hand. The EU 
provisions must be provided in the form that leaves the greatest possible freedom for 
the Member States’ actions with respect to the national legislations. If possible, 
provisions prescribing minimum standards are preferable. This is favoured in order 
to enable the Member States to provide their own, stricter national standards. 
According to Jans – Vedder, for example instruments of non-binding character are to 
                                                
133 For example oil, electricity, natural gas and renewable energy resources were treated as any other 
products falling under the scope of internal market provisions. Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 189. 
134 Environment was also taken widely into consideration during the years before the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, and the legal bases varied between Articles 95, 308 and the environmental legal 
basis 175 EC. Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 210. 
135 Article 5 TEU. 
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be preferred before binding measures, if possible. 136  In order to evaluate the 
possibility for providing of non-binding provisions, former experiences have to be 
taken into consideration. The legality of measures by the EU can according to case 
law be contested only if the measures are to be regarded as “manifestly 
inappropriate” in light of the proportionality principle,137 so the likeliness of a 
provisions being faulted in the light of the proportionality principle is highly 
unlikely. 
 
According to the subsidiary principle, within areas that do not fall under the 
exclusive competence of the Union, the Union shall act only insofar as the objectives 
of the action cannot be reached sufficiently at national level, and thereby better at 
Union level. The principle contains as well a negative (not sufficiently achieved by 
Member States) as a positive criterion (better achieved by the Union), of which both 
must be met for the action to be justified.138  Under the principle, the content of any 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to reach the objectives of the 
Treaties. The declared aim of the principle is to ensure that decisions are, if possible, 
taken as close to the citizens of the EU as possible. A further going aim of 
subsidiarity is the protection of national powers and interests, a motif also having 
shaped the Energy Title. There are two perspectives to subsidiarity: a legal and a 
political one. Subsidiarity has on one hand been seen as a shied against EU power, 
and on the other hand as a double-edged sword, which can be used in either direction 
to fit the political objective pursued.139 When applied to Article 194(2) TFEU, the 
subsidiarity principle could work either way. Constantin argues that subsidiarity as a 
legal principle rarely is applied, and the competences between the EU and the 
Member States are determined by negotiation and balancing.140 On the other hand, 
the principle should steer all Union action, and therefore consequently influence all 
decision-making without specific application. The control of the principle of 
subsidiarity was although strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. The weak ex post 
                                                
136  Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 17. See Council Resolution of 7 October 1997 on the drafting, 
implementation and enforcement of Community environmental law, which stresses the importance of 
possibly informal procedures. 
137  See e.g. C-491/01 - British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco of 10 
December 2002, para 123. 
138 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 14.  
139 Constantin 2008, p. 152. 
140 Constantin 2008, p. 153. 
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control141 (the afterwards control exercised by the CJEU) has been strengthened with 
an ex ante control system (when negotiating and adopting EU legislation) as well as 
a reinforced supervisory control.142 
 
The Subsidiarity Protocol obliges the Commission to consult widely before the 
proposition of any legislative acts. 143  A detailed statement concerning the 
compliance with subsidiarity must be provided, including the responses regarding the 
legislative proposals from the national parliaments. If one-third of all Member State 
votes express non-compliance with subsidiarity, the Commission must annul its 
proposal. 144  The Subsidiarity Protocol also determines the procedure for 
infringement of subsidiarity under Article 263 TFEU, alleged by a Member State, in 
which the CJEU has jurisdiction. The more powerful Member States could, 
according to the strengthened control of subsidiarity, exercise their power in energy 
questions based on subsidiarity control.  
 
Although it is clear that the global problem of climate change requires global action, 
the possibility to achieve remarkable measures at national level should not be 
overlooked. According to Jans – Vedder, any action to “prevent cross-border 
environmental effects” would satisfy the requirements of the subsidiarity principle.145 
In other words, any trans frontier actions would be justified because of the territorial 
limitations of most state actions. For example the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
of the EU covers only about 40% of all direct GHG emissions146, which leaves 
significant responsibility to the Member States in the field of industrial installations. 
The EU provisions governing Member State mitigation measures often provide 
options for the Member States as to the national implementation of the provisions. 
The discretion in national implementation is positive, since the Member States differ 
                                                
141 If a Member State wants to bring a claim to the CJEU, the claim has to go through the national 
government or to be played out without the national government in the role of non-privileged 
applicants, charged with a close to impossible burden. See Rossi in Biondi – Eeckhout - Ripley 2012, 
p. 97. 
142 See more: Constantin 2008, pp. 164-169. 
143 C 310/207 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 
3. The wide consultation process is referred to as a ‘subsidiarity calculus. Craig – de Búrca 2011, p 
96. 
144 Article 7 of the protocol. 
145 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 15. 
146 Peeters – Stallworthy – de Cendra de Larragán (eds.) 2012, p. 4. 
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significantly in governance and energy mixes, but the EU usually governs the larger 
picture.  
 
The energy policy objectives outlined in Article 194(1) TFEU, where the 
achievement of the policy objectives are to be carried out ‘in a spirit of solidarity’ 
has been proposed to enhance the subsidiarity principle and to emphasize Unions 
privileged position in exercising shared competences. Also the emphasis on the 
solidarity principle was demanded by the Polish Government due to fear of EU 
intermix in the national energy supply.147 The reference to the spirit of solidarity 
‘between the Member States’ is supposedly merely a historical approach to the 
matter. Many of the effects of energy provisions have a strong internal market 
dimension and the physical dimension including infrastructure and investments have 
an in-depth trans-European dimension, which cannot either be overlooked.148 When 
proposing the RE –directive, the Commission concluded that the measures and 
objectives proposed in the RE-directive can not be reached at Member State level 
since ‘real progress only began to be made when the European Union adopted 
legislative instruments containing targets to be reached by a given deadline’.149 This, 
if anything, would speak for new binding targets during the next period of mitigation 
of climate change from 2020 to 2030.  
 
3.2.3 The norm hierarchy in the EU 
 
According to the norm hierarchy in the European Union, the Treaties enjoy a 
supremacy over the directives, but the directives can also be seen as formal 
expressions of the EU interest and of certain accepted standards as well as definitions 
of the many open-ended strands in the Treaties.150 The constitutional character of the 
Treaty is emphasized in new rules on responsibilities and competences for the EU. 
The distinction between the primary and secondary norms is clear on a theoretical 
level. The primary provisions determine the content of the secondary provisions. 
Secondary provisions can also merely be provided if a competence has been 
                                                
147 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p 268. 
148 COM (2015) 337 final, p. 4. 
149 COM (2008) 19 final, p. 9. 
150  According to Talus, the directives are also formal expressions of general principles like 
subsidiarity, proportionality and the least restrictive regulative method. Talus 2014(b), p. 40. 
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provided for this in the primary provisions. The competence can also be implicitly 
derived if it has not been restricted in an area. In reality, the hierarchical relationship 
between the primary and secondary legislative instruments is not as clear.  
 
In the energy sector, the secondary legislation has been provided first, and has 
thereby determined the scope for the primary provisions, which were provided 
afterwards. Primary legislation introduced after secondary could widen, but not 
substantially shrink the competences of the European Union because competences 
already had been exercised to a certain extent. Thereby, it is not possible that the 
Energy Title would have shrunk the scope of Union action. Independently allowed 
EU action also results in the need of alternations of national legislation infringing on 
EU legislation in cases of evident contradiction in jeopardizing the Union’s 
objectives. It seems that energy provisions taken by the Union could shrink the scope 
of action for the Member States to a minimum,151 which is contravened by the 
wording of Article 194(2) TFEU, but clearly agreed to up to a certain level by 
Member States due to the acceptance of providing of secondary provisions. The text 
of Article 194(2) TFEU seems ineffective in this regard, and appears merely as a 
façade.  
According to Talus, the secondary legislative body could, in addition, provide certain 
clarity as to the interpretation of the scope of the implementation of the primary 
provisions. The existing secondary legislative body can determine the political 
boundaries for the practice of the primary provisions. Talus further argues that the 
progress attained by the pre-Lisbon secondary legislation does enable a wider 
interpretation of the primary energy provisions,152 a plausible argument. 
 
The constitutive Treaties lay the foundations for the European Union. According to 
the Council, the TFEU was not meant to have a constitutional character,153 but 
innovations from the proposed Constitutional Treaty, which was abandoned, were 
incorporated into TEU and TFEU. It seems, that the innovations of the failed 
Constitutional Treaty are reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, while avoiding the use of 
                                                
151 Pielow – Levendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 269. 
152 Talus 2008, p. 641-642. 
153 Council doc 11218/07 paras 1 and 3. 
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constitutional nomenclature.154 Since the EU is not a state, the characterization of the 
Lisbon Treaty as a constitution would be questionable,155 but the constitutional 
character justifies a somewhat constitutional approach to interpretation of the Treaty 
texts, nevertheless not forgetting the political dimension. Constitutional features are 
inevitably visible in the TFEU. For example the supremacy of the Treaties over 
Member State law at any level, including national constitutional laws, is considered a 
constitutional indicator of importance.156  The reason for highlighting these attributes 
to the Treaties is the justification of an application of a slightly constitutional 
approach when analysing the primary provisions. 
 
3.3 A framework for an energy policy 
 
The field of energy has many idiosyncrasies, of which firstly, a distinct socio-
political dimension characterizes the energy-field. An energy policy’s ultimate 
objective is securing the energy flow in the area. Secondly, physical idiosyncrasies 
characterize the field: the transfer of energy material is bound to a functioning 
network. Thirdly, the energy sector is intensive in research, technology and 
investments, which is why the sizes and long-term effects on the investments are 
characteristic for the field.157 The energy-sector has gradually been differentiated, 
and can, according to most, no longer be regarded as belonging to any other field of 
Union politics.158 Still, energy is interlaced and dependant on many other fields of 
Union policies, of which most prominently the environmental policy and the free 
movement of goods. Nevertheless, the somewhat indistinct energy policy has 
become a distinct and vital part of the Union’s internal and external policies, and a 
field characterized by recent and extensive development. 
 
According to the Commission, the leading environmental objective in the EU is 
steering the Union as a whole towards scarcer and more sustainable energy 
                                                
154 Türk in Biondi – Eckhout 2012, p. 62. 
155 See von Bogandy – Bast 2010. 
156 von Bogandy – Bast 2010, p. 193. 
157 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 179-182. 
158 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 277. 
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utilisation.159 The harsh reality is, although, that the energy flow to the area is the 
most important function of the policy. The leading environmental objective in 
relation to the ultimate function of the energy policy is, however, the progress toward 
sustainability. As energy accounts for over 80% of greenhouse gases in the EU, 
energy is the main source of climate change and air pollution.160  
 
The leading provisions in the Treaties regarding environment are Articles 191 and 
192 TFEU and the energy provision, Article 194 TFEU, with its reference to new 
and renewable energy, as well as the general reference to environment and 
sustainable development in Article 11. The indication of a ‘high level of protection’ 
in Article 191 and the implication in Article 11 TFEU of integrating the 
environmental objectives in all the actions of the EU are suggested to be superior to 
energy aspects161, which would suggest a tension between on one hand Article 191 
and on the other Article 194 TFEU. Due to the direct reference in the Energy Title to 
the environmental provisions, the primary legal framework for the energy provision 
lies within both the energy and environmental provisions. In addition to the 
framework provided in the Treaties, secondary legislation in the field of energy is 
extensive. The key obligations derived from the regulatory secondary framework 
include the member states having to secure non-discriminatory facilities and 
distributors in their energy network as well as allowing customers to choose their 
supplier and have access to the necessary networks.162 The internal market provisions 
are a major guideline for the energy provisions.  
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a specific mention of climate change. Article 
191(1) TFEU has set out the objectives of EU environmental law to promote 
‘measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change’. Even though the acute matter 
of climate change is emphasized in the Treaty, it can be argued that climate change 
can be identified in the same category as biodiversity, desertification and other 
                                                
159 See COM (2006) 105 final: Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy. 
160 Com (2007) 1 final: An Energy policy for Europe, p. 3. 
161 Talus 2014(a), p. 186. 
162 Talus 2014(a), p. 68. 
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environmental problems, instead of being supreme to them.163 The EU target of 20% 
renewable energy production by the year 2020, not to mention the more ambitious 
far-reaching objectives, require versatile and far-reaching measures. The objective of 
reaching a 80-95% reduction of GHG:s by 2050 compared to 1990 levels has been 
confirmed by the Council on several occasions. What, according to the Commission, 
is needed is “drawing together legislation (existing, new and planned), organisational 
and institutional initiatives, voluntary actions, supporting measures, and awareness 
and best practice initiatives, using market instruments and research and technology 
development”.164  
Considered one of the most important changes to the lives of the Europeans in the 
energy sector legislation is the increase of renewable energy sources in the total 
energy consumption. What seems to have been the idea was first to try changing the 
behaviour of Europeans on a voluntary basis, which, when unsuccessful, was 
changed to binding instruments. An example of mandatory legislation is the adoption 
of the RE-directive on promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, 
which did set out mandatory objectives for each Member State in order to reach the 
20% objective EU-widely. If looking at the national targets in annex 1 in the 
Directive, the average target increase of renewable energy sources for each member 
state is around 10%. When looking at especially Finland, with its target of 38%, and 
Sweden with a target of 49%, it is clear that the targets affect the Member States’ 
choices between different (types of) energy resources, and at least in some cases, 
significantly.  
Policy issues characterise the energy field in EU governance. Policies are described 
in declaratory or analytical statements, but not in law. It is argued that the EU organs 
lack the competence to develop a viable energy policy.165 In addition to the possible 
problems in interpretation of Article 194(2) TFEU, also the weak taxation powers 
provided the Union is problematic from an environmental point of view. Extensive 
taxation powers would provide the Union with tools to discourage the use of certain 
energy sources, although not significantly affecting the structure of the Member 
States’ energy supply. 
                                                
163 See De Cendra de Larrágan in Peeters – Stallworthy – de Cendra de Larragán (eds.) 2012, p. 41.  
164 Commission report: European Climate Change Programme, June 2001, p. 45-46. 
165 Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. V. 
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According to Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude, who provided a proposal for a 
European Energy Community or an Energy Union in order to meet the challenges of 
the energy policy, the existing institutional framework does not cater for a common 
energy policy.166 The lack of consistency in the energy policies of the different 
Member States results in a fragmented EU energy policy. The codification of the 
possibility of fragmentation in the Lisbon Treaty is seen as a concern above all from 
a long-term perspective, since it might undermine the possibility for the Union not 
only to react to the climate change, but also forcing the EU to be dependent on 
energy import. A consistent energy policy would also strengthen the voice of the EU 
in international forums.167  Also the lack of a specific external competence is 
problematic in this regard. In addition to this, the EU can enter into international 
agreements merely with ‘third countries and international organisations’, but not 
with for example companies (e.g. Gazprom), according to Article 21 TEU. 
The effect of the introduction of the Energy Title is a need for emphasising certain 
aspects of energy policy. Firstly, EU energy policy is now confirmedly the 
coordinated action of equally the Union and the Member States, and the governance 
of the common energy policy lays on the cooperation between all parties. Since 
every legislative matter falling under the scope of 194(2) TFEU is subject to a 
complicated process, where the outcome is unclear, it is fair to say that there really is 
no coherent EU energy policy.168 The maintenance of the current level of integration 
requires common political and legislative tools in order to foster cohesion and 
solidarity among the Member States, a primarily political objective.169 
 
3.4 A legal basis – legitimacy for energy provisions 
3.4.1 Introduction of a specific legal basis for energy provisions 
 
Even though the Lisbon Treaty clarified the status of energy provisions, these are 
still a fruitful object of research because of the uncertainty of interpretation and a 
                                                
166 See Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. II. 
167 Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. V-VII. 
168 Morata – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. 3. 
169 Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. VII. 
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certain tension between the objectives of the energy policy and the environmental 
objectives. The Energy Title is broadly determined and therefore open to 
interpretation. By formulating the energy provisions as has been done, the legislator 
has taken a conscious choice in investing the European institutions and the European 
Court with a wide discretion as interpreters of the provisions. The problems with the 
Energy Title that will be discussed in the following sections are the following. The 
first problematic aspect is the reference in the caveat in Article 194(2) referring to 
Article 192(2) TFEU regarding the need for unanimity in certain energy-related 
decisions. Also the overlapping provisions might cause certain problems regarding 
the choice of a legal basis. The relationship between Article 194(2) and Article 
192(2) TFEU is unclear, especially concerning renewable energy legislation, and is 
therefore a fruitful research objective. The second problematic aspect is the 
possibility of a total exclusion of competence for the union to provide provisions 
affecting the Member States’ energy rights by use of the primary energy provisions, 
stated in Article 194 (2)(2) TFEU, which might give rise to problems in relation to 
the environmental objectives.  
 
According to the Commission, stated in a framework policy for climate and energy 
in the period from 2020 to 2030 “Articles 191 to 193 of the TFEU confirm and 
further specify EU competencies in the area of climate change”170.  Even though EU 
organ’s dictums occasionally are obscure and ill founded, a statement like this could 
indicate that the Energy Title is carefully crafted and merely the interpretation that is 
wanting exists due to the lack of case law. Though an infallible interpretation 
requires a precedent by the CJEU, at least the boundaries within which the 
interpretation reasonably can vary are an interesting research objective. It is 
especially interesting to compare the scope of the interpretation possibilities of the 
Energy Title, the space for measures and the scope the provisions provide for the 
environmental objectives in order to see whether the principle of integration is 
visible throughout the Energy Title. The providing of provisions and policy-making 
has been a slow process, and apparently continues to be so even after the Lisbon 
Treaty. Pielow – Lewendel propound the comprehension that the new Energy Title 
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could enable a more comprehensive and integrated energy policy.171 Not least 
because of the introduction of a legal basis. 
 
The legal basis for regulations regarding the energy sector in the EU is found in 
Articles 194(2) and 194(3) TFEU in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), of which Article 194(3) proscribes processed related to energy 
taxation, and is not of vital importance for this thesis. Article 194(2) TFEU 
determines the power of the EU in the field of energy in relation to the Member 
States, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding the interpretation. The Article 
includes no mention regarding the external competence of the Union in energy 
matters, and any mention regarding the external competence in energy matters 
cannot either be found elsewhere in the Treaty.172 According to the legal basis found 
in Article 194(2) TFEU, the institutions of the Union cannot adopt measures in 
directing the Member States as to production of their energy resources for the benefit 
of the Union; neither as to adopt measures regarding the choice of energy resources. 
The divide of competences is specified in the text of Article 194 TFEU: 
 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on 
energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:  
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;   
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;   
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and   
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.  
 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the 
objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
                                                
171 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2011, pp. 267-268. 
172 COM (2011) 539 final, On security of energy supply and international cooperation - "The EU 
Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders", determines the boundaries of 
intergovernmental agreements between the Member States and third parts, but only national states, in 




Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions 
for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).  
 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European 
Parliament, establish the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a 
fiscal nature.  
 
Article 194(1) sets out the aims of the energy policy, whereas the legal bases can be 
found in Articles 194(2) and 194(3) TFEU. The power to pursue the objectives in 
Article 194(1) is granted the Union in Article 194(2)(1), whereas Article 194(2)(2) 
imposes restraints to the competences, and Article 194(3) TFEU requires a special 
legislative procedure for energy-related taxation. 
 
The article sets out the four main aims of the EU policy in energy matters in order to 
ensure the functioning of the (internal) energy market, as well as pointing out the 
aims to be executed in a ‘spirit of solidarity’ between the member states. As the 
Treaty, interestingly enough, does not define what energy constitutes of, the logical 
result would be to include all types of energy: nuclear, oil, gas and coal as well as 
renewable sources of energy.173  Legislation furthering the aims of Article 194(1) 
TFEU is to be adopted with a qualified majority, but matters of legislation falling 
within the scope of the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU are most likely subject to 
unanimity in the special legislative process, the so-called SLP.174 The area covered 
by the Article is merely legislative action taken by the Union.175 The Article 
empowers the EU with explicit competence in regard to ‘establish the (and by this, 
all176) measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1’. The result of 
the inclusion of the caveat in the Energy Title is that the EU cannot take any 
measures over a certain level of signification affecting the energy rights of the 
Member States within the scope of its energy policy, and the measures have to be 
                                                
173 The Treaty does neither include any reference to the Euratom Treaty, which makes the stance 
regarding nuclear energy especially unclear. Haghighi 2008, p. 472. 
174 For further reading about the SLP, see De Sadeleer 2014 p. 153. 
175 This is determined in Case T-370/11 Poland v Commission 7 March 2013, paras 11-17. 
176 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 267. 
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conducted within the environmental policy area of the Union. The new enabling 
clause and legal basis in 194(2) TFEU however without doubt brings the wanted 
legitimacy to the EU’s action in the field of energy, and a clear and welcomed 
steering of the energy policy into the environmental policy of the Union. 177 
 
The inclusion of the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU is most likely the result of the 
press from certain Member States including Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, which possess extensive energy resources.178 The process of drafting the 
Lisbon Treaty was not a profoundly transparent process, so the impact of any 
lobbying is difficult to determine.179 Article 194 TFEU provides for provisions ‘in 
the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment’, which clearly steers 
the policy of energy provisions into the field of environmental law. Based on Article 
194 TFEU, the Member States have the full discretion to choose which energy 
resources to utilize, without any other restrictions than the general principles and the 
existing secondary legislative body and, most prominently, measures taken within 
the environmental policy of the Union. This again places significance on the 
secondary provisions, in the field of which the Union already has practiced its 
competence and thereby restricted the Member State’s scope of action.  
 
Article 194(2)(1) TFEU prescribes co-decision and qualified majority voting. Braun 
has centralized the main points regarding the Article as follows: “On the one hand, 
paragraph 1 [Art. 194] proposes opportunities [for] the Parliament while paragraph 2 
sets limitations. The role of the EP [European Parliament] is to exploit the first 
paragraph and use it to the best of its abilities”. 180 The scope of Article 194 might 
however be very limited, since possibly no action provided under the Article can 
affect the Member States’ energy rights. When a provision is based on Article 194(2) 
TFEU, the role of the European Parliament is merely to give an opinion in the 
matter.181  
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The first paragraph of Article 194(2) TFEU stresses the need to preserve the 
environment whereas the second paragraph proscribes that significant alterations to 
energy forms introduced by the Union are impossible without unity in the decisive 
activity. It is apparent that the Member States have sought to retain the energy 
powers implicitly retained from the beginning of European integration, and 
according to Talus, the purpose of the Energy Title was that it “[...] should a priori 
not restrict Member State’s choices with respect to energy sources.”182  
The Energy Title only allows for a EU energy policy ‘in the context of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to 
preserve and improve the environment’, which a) places energy in an environmental 
context and b) imposes restrictions on the competence and limits, including the 
energy policy solely in the internal market setting. The internal market includes the 
free movement of goods and undistorted conditions of competition, which, according 
to Vedder, applied to the field of energy only allows for an energy policy concerning 
exports and imports.183  In addition to the restrictions on the Union provided by 
Article 194(2) TFEU, the Member States have retained the right to conduct their 
bilateral energy relations with non-EU countries on their own conditions, while 
naturally being subject to the general Member State obligations.  
 
The Energy Title can be seen as a compromise between on one hand the desire of the 
Member States to retain control of their natural resources and in taxation issues and 
on the other hand a shared Union competence for other energy matters.184 Hancher – 
Salerno have described the Energy Title as a carefully crafted compromise between 
the sovereignty of the Member States and shared Union competences.185 The most 
prominent result of the introduction of the Energy Title was the inclusion of energy 
in the formal EU competences, providing legitimacy to legislative measures.  
 
The energy policy objectives now laid out in the Lisbon Treaty are aimed at the 
harmonisation of the energy policy. The expected result of the codification of energy 
                                                
182 Talus notes that due to the existing framework of secondary legislation and the decision-making 
procedures in the EU the restriction of the Union’s powers in relation to the Member States’ energy 
rights might not be as simple as it seems from the text of the Treaty. Talus 2014(b), p. 179.  
183 Vedder 2010, p. 291.This is yet another significant restriction of the scope of the Energy Title.  
184 Andoura – Hancher – van der Woude 2010, p. 76. 
185 Hancher – Salerno in Biondi – Eeckhout – Ripley 2012, p. 372. 
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issues is the reduction of fragmentation and the contradictory signals in the field.186 
The harmonisation and possibility of developing a common energy policy are other 
important aspects to the introduction of the Energy Title. The text of Article 194(2) 
stating that the objectives in Article 194(1) TFEU are to be pursued “in a spirit of 
solidarity between the Member States” gives special force to the application of the 
solidarity principle. The application of the principle calls for joint approach, an idea 
that originates from European Steel and Coal Community. The inclusion also 
indicates that energy policy aims cannot be reached sufficiently at national level, and 
at the same time enables a Member State suffering from energy shortage to apply for 
and obtain the assistance of other Member States.187 
 
Also the pure existence of Article 194 is positive for the development of the energy 
policy, since the EU no longer has to depend on related competences in accordance 
to the flexibility clause in order to develop legislation in the field of energy.188 The 
Treaty status presents new opportunities for the EU, but the caveat in Article 194(2) 
TFEU imposes an essential constraint to the Union’s performance. Energy matters 
are predicted to be more important than ever with the introduction of the Energy 
Title. The introduction of the Energy Title is seen to mirror the desire to take role as 
leader by world standards in resolving the global problem of climate change by huge 
amendments, especially in the energy sector.189   
 
In a majority of energy-specific legislation cases a qualified majority would most 
likely adopt relevant legislature in the field of energy according to the special 
legislative procedure determined in Article 289(2) TFEU. There are two exceptions 
in the field of energy where EU competence is especially limited: 1) measures 
significantly affecting the states’ choice between different energy sources and 2) 
measures significantly affecting the general structure of their energy supply. 
Legislation and decisions affecting these fields shall be adopted only by unanimous 
vote in the Council. The same unanimity structure is, according to Article 192(3), 
                                                
186  Morata – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. 3. 
187 SRU, German Advisory Council on the Environment, Pathways towards a 100% renewable 
electricity system, Special Report 2011, pp. 186-187. Available at 
http://www.umweltrat.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/02_Special_Reports/2011_10_Special_Report_
Pathways_renewables.html (3.1.2016). 
188 Sandoval – Zapater in Morata – Sandoval (eds.) 2012, p. 109. 
189 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 261. 
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adopted in measures regarding energy taxation. The requirement of unanimity voting 
is regarded to possibly “be a barrier to ambitious renewable energy measures” and 
thereby Peeters concludes that the prospect for ambitious renewable energy 
legislation is not promising. 190  The level of ambition and will power among the 
Member States is conclusive in this. The voting in the Council shows that all 
Member States were in favour of adoption of the RE directive.191 Further on, 
increasingly heavy measures of mitigation might alter the unity. 
 
3.4.2 An external energy policy? 
 
The Energy Title makes no reference to the external dimension of the EU energy 
policy. It might, therefore, be in external competences that the energy competences 
are the most difficult to predict.  The external relations are crucial in the energy 
sector, as the EU is largely dependent on externally imported energy, as well as 
willing to enter into international agreements in the field.  
 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, external competence in energy matters was frequently 
based on Article 308 TEC (now Article 352 TFEU). International agreements such as 
the Energy Charter Treaty192 were concluded based on that Article. As there now is a 
specific legal basis for energy matters, but no reference to external competence, the 
legal basis for external energy action is unclear. The use of Article 352 was allowed 
as long as Treaty amendments would not limit its application, and a more specific 
legal basis altered the pre-Lisbon status quo. Since the wording of Article 194 TFEU 
states that the energy policy shall be conducted ‘in the context of the establishment 
of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment’, the EU energy policy is clearly placed in an internal market 
perspective, possibly vacating no room for external action. External energy actions 
will possibly have to be conducted under the environmental Article 192 TFEU,193 
which in the latest Treaty alternation included climate change as a regional and 
worldwide environmental problem to be addressed within the Union’s environmental 
                                                
190 Peeters 2014, p. 46. 
191 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 2008/0016 (COD), Brussels, 6 April 2009. 
192 Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 on the 
conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter 
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policy. On the other hand, as no explicit mention of an external energy policy exists, 
a consequent supposition is that the external policy should be conducted in a similar 
manner as before the introduction of the Energy Title. The external powers should 
according to this interpretation be derived from the legal practice of the European 
courts, similarly as pre-Lisbon. 194 
 
4 The legal basis for energy provisions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This section will process the possible problems related to the interpretation of the 
primary provisions in the Energy Title. Based on what has been stated above in 
section 3, the situation for the vertical division of powers seems fairly determined. 
Thereby, the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce major alternations to the division of 
powers. What might be the problems are the scope of the caveat in Article 194(2) 
TFEU and the choice of a legal basis for energy provisions, especially concerning 
provisions regarding renewable energy. This section aims to chart the technical 
issues at hand in relation to the correct legal basis for energy provisions, and 
especially determine the correct legal basis for renewable energy provisions. 
 
The impact of Article 194(2) TFEU upon Union competences is dependent on three 
different factors. When analysing the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU, the important 
consideration is measurement of the material scope of the three listed rights, which 
the Union’s energy policy ‘shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine: 1) 
the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, 2) the Member States choice 
between different energy sources and 3) the general structure of its energy supply. 
The material scope can be measured by three different factors:  
A) the requirement of effect by the measure on the rights, demanded for a legal basis 
in Article 192(2)(c),  
B) the legal signification of the caveat,195 
C) and the relationship between Articles 194(2) and 192(2)(c).  
                                                
194 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 197. 




There is an apparent tension between the idea of the common Union approach to 
energy matters stated in Article 194(1) and the nationalistic approach to the use of 
energy sources in Article 194(2) TFEU. The observation of the tension must indicate 
that the rights attained by the Member States in Article 194(2) TFEU are not as 
absolute as they seem. In addition to the tension between the common Union 
approach and the nationalistic approach, the EU shall promote the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy according to Article 194(1) TFEU. Even this has 
a certain level of signification on the choice of a Member State’s energy mix, since 
promotion of certain energy resources affect resource competition. Also in this, the 
Energy Title seems to be incompatible, and therefore the effects of the caveat in 
Article 194(2) TFEU cannot be absolute. The search for the fundamental meaning of 
the Energy Title involves many segments. According to Johnston – van der Marel 
the energy rights of the Member States, as determined in Article 194(2) TFEU can 
either be absolute or relative.196 
 
In addition to the problems with interpretation of Article 194(2) TFEU, the wording 
of the Energy Title is considered too specific. The list in Article 194(1) TFEU, a-d, is 
meant to be exhaustive, according to the general rules of interpretation of EU law. 
Still, some measures, like promotion of certain technologies, do not fit into the list, 
whereby a clearer wording is desired. The Energy Title may provide a clearer basis 
for measures with less radical effect on national energy policies while at the same 
time lacking a clear internal market foundation.197 This means that measures that 
pursue the aims listed in letters a-d, but lie outside the framework of the internal 
market, do not fit within the scope of Article 194 TFEU.198  Also the lack of an 
external competence is problematic, as stated above. 
 
                                                
196 Both interpretations are possible, and need to be taken into consideration in this text. Johnston – 
van den Marel 2013, p. 183. 
197 Bjørnebye 2010, p.144. 
198 Haralsdottir 2014, p. 210. 
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4.2 Analysis of Article 194(2) TFEU 
4.2.1 Requirement of effect 
 
Johnston & van der Marel provide the three, in my opinion, most credible ways of 
interpreting the caveat as follows. 199 The legal basis referred to in the caveat 
regarding measures affecting the Member States energy rights in Article 192(2) 
TFEU can be interpreted in, inter alia, the following ways. Firstly, the text in the 
caveat can be seen as a subject to serious limitations for the EU in the field, and as a 
result there could be expected no, or minimum harmonisation. The reasoning for this 
interpretation is the expression “energy rights” used in the Article, which could 
imply that measures of the Union to no extent could affect Member States’ “energy 
rights” when provided under the Energy Title. The outcome of this interpretation is 
rather undesirable, since the EU’s competence would be limited to a minimum in the 
field of providing energy provisions under the Energy Title. If the interpretation of 
the caveat is that no measures affecting a Member State’s energy rights can be 
provided under Article 194(2) TFEU, another legal basis must be used.  
The second way of interpreting the Article is that the measures taken by the Union 
should not significantly affect the member states’ ‘energy rights’, and should 
therefore be subject to some limitations. There is, although, no mention of any 
threshold in the caveat. This interpretation is based on the referral to Article 192(2) 
TFEU, which is seen as a comparison but not directly an alternative legal basis. The 
result of this way of interpretation could lead to some minimum harmonisation under 
the Energy Title. The third reasonable interpretation is that the measures of the EU 
should not affect Member States’ energy rights unless all member states agree.200 
This interpretation might involve an opt-out or a veto possibility, nevertheless 
including the possibility of using the Energy Title as a legal basis for energy 
provisions affecting a Member States energy rights. According to this interpretation 
the caveat could enable a Member State to opt out on a provision falling under the 
                                                
199 Johnston – van den Marel 2013, pp. 181-183. The authors provide five different approaches to the 
interpretation, of which I above have chosen and simplified the three in my opinion most credible 
solutions. 
200 For more extensive discussion regarding the technical interpretation of Article 194(2): see 
Johnston – van der Marel (2013) and Haralsdottír (2014). 
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scope of 194(2) TFEU, but not hinder the providing of the provision provided under 
the Energy Title.201 
The third way of interpretation is that provisions could be provided under the Energy 
Title if all Member States agree to provide provision. The measure would therefore 
be the subject of veto. This interpretation is backed up by the history of the drafting 
of the Constitutional Treaty, which suggests that unanimity was proposed as the 
legislative process under the Article.202 
Other scholars have provided their interpretations as well, but no unity has been 
reached as to the interpretation, and of the above-suggested three options, any might 
be applicable. Guimaraes-Purokoski regards the capability of the Union to provide 
energy-specific provisions under the scope of the legal basis in Article 194(2) TFEU 
minimal, and experiences this inconsequent,203 with which I agree, if so is the case. 
Why list such a limited scope for the Energy Title? It seems that there is more to the 
Energy Title than what is directly visible. 
Based on the wording of the caveat, it is clear that the intention of the caveat is the 
retention of certain matters within the control of the Member States. The use of the 
word ‘right’ confirms this. The word is rarely used in the Treaty to describe the 
positions of Member States.204 The exercise of powers by the Union is controlled by 
the general principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which constitute the basis 
for the use of the competences. The caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU is a special 
provision concerning the exercise of Union powers, apparently intended to ascertain 
that certain matters are handled at national level.205 
Essentially, there is a difference in promoting and restricting the use of energy 
resources, but is it really necessary to limit the jurisdiction of the EU on TFEU level 
in a matter which, ultimately, could be of vital importance in endeavour of mitigating 
climate change? Similar caveats as the one in Article 194(2) TFEU did exist before 
the Lisbon Treaty in the Environmental Title, and the same reserve clause still exists 
                                                
201 Fouquet – Nysten – Johnston 2012, pp. 16-17. 
202 Johnston – van den Marel 2013, p. 184. 
203 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 196. 
204 The other occurrences are found in Article 79(5) and 153(4) TFEU. 
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in Article 192(2) TFEU, which might be the correct legal basis for measures 
significantly affecting a Member State’s energy rights.  
 
4.2.2 Level of signification 
 
Whether the Energy Title can be used for providing energy provisions affecting the 
Member States’ energy rights, is dependent on the requirement of the level of 
signification of the measures. If it is to be determined that any measures affecting the 
Member States’ energy rights cannot be based on Article 194(2) TFEU, another legal 
basis for these provisions has to be found. When assessing the definition and scope 
of the term ‘significant’, the institutions have to make their conclusion or ultimately 
will the Court of Justice have to rule. There is a possibility that the institutions within 
the Union have some discretion as to the determination of the level of significance, 
but ultimately the determination of the level of significance is an in casu assessment 
left to the discretion of the CJEU. There is an apparent need for clarity in regard to 
whether, when and to what extent Article 192(1) TFEU can be used as a basis for 
renewable energy provisions, which affect, but not significantly affect, the Member 
State’s choices between different energy sources.206  As in relation to Article 192(2) 
TFEU, the ‘significant affect’ clearly needs a specification of the level of intensity 
required. Article 194(2) TFEU is interpreted to either cover all measures affecting a 
Member States’ right to determine the issues covered by the Article, or measures of a 
certain intensity of effect. The determination of whether the interpretation of the text 
in the caveat of Article 194(2) TFEU, “[s]uch measures shall not affect” should be 
interpreted ‘such measures shall not significantly affect’, is solely left to be 
determined by the EU institutions or, ultimately, by CJEU. An interpretation of the 
caveat including a threshold would significantly widen the scope of the use of Article 
194(2) TFEU. Since no such interpretation has had general application or 
recognition, all other possibilities of interpretation are still open. 
 
One thing that speaks against the widening of the wording of the caveat is the fact 
that as an exceptional rule limiting the general rule of shared competence in the field, 
                                                
206 Peeters is representing the same opinion. Peeters 2014, p. 45. 
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the text of the caveat should, according to case law, be interpreted strictly.207  The 
most common interpretation in line with this is that Article 194(2) TFEU only is 
applicable when measures are not affecting the right of a Member State concerning 
the exploitation, the choice between the different energy sources and the general 
structure of energy supply. It has been argued that the effect is not only to be 
concerning the use of energy resources, but also the mere right to choose between 
different energy resources.208  
Then to what extent does the promotion, exclusion or imposition of certain energy 
resources impact the Member States’ energy rights? What is considered a significant 
impact, and is the level of significance even of any meaning when assessing the 
applicability of Article 194(2) TFEU? At least in Peeters’ opinion, “[s]trong political 
opposition against strengthening the climate package may lead one or more Member 
States to use the legal argument that new, further going” (further than the current RE 
directive) “climate policies have to be adopted by unanimity in view of Article 
192(2) TFEU because they significantly209 affect the Member States choices between 
different energy sources”.210 This interpretation is credible, but not necessarily 
correct. Since the Member States in the RE-directive have agreed to a certain 
attribution of powers, who is to determine the level of signification regarding 
provisions requiring a higher level of powers than he existing secondary legislative 
body? 
It is clear that the energy requirements by the EU, uppermost set out in the RE-
directive, has required significant measures for some Member States. In cases like 
Latvia and Finland, with requirements in the RE-directive of increase of renewable 
energy sources from 32.5 to 40 per cent respectively from 28.5 to 38 per cent, the 
shares of renewable energy increase must, in the author’s opinion, be seen as 
significant and clearly restricting regarding the choice of the Member States’ energy 
mixes. Still, the Commission argued that since ‘[a]ll Member States already use 
renewable energy and all have already decided to increase renewable energy's share’, 
the RE-directive ‘will not significantly affect Member States' choice between 
                                                
207 An exceptional provision restricting a general rule should be interpreted with an as close reference 
to the wording as possible. See case C-36/98, paras 46 and 49. 
208 Fouquet – Nysten – Johnston 2012, p. 17. 
209 Italics added by author. 
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different energy sources or the general structure of their energy supply’.211 An 
increase of 10% or more in renewable energy sources in a Member State, did 
according to the Commission, not reach the level of significance required in Article 
192(2) TFEU. It will hence be interesting to see what level of signification is 
required to constitute a significant effect, and the question about the required level of 
significance remains. One thing that is clear is that the Member States cannot veto 
against any change of the status quo,212 which ultimately needs to be specified and 
clarified. The same applies to the certainty of the need of application of Article 
192(2) TFEU as soon as one Member State’s energy rights have been significantly 
affected213, or the possible need for the application of Article 192(1) TFEU as a legal 
basis if the measure affects the national energy rights. 214 
The importance of the determination of the level of signification culminates in the 
need for the clarity of the correct choice of a legal basis for measures affecting and 
for measures significantly affecting the Member States’ energy rights. The absence 
of a determination of the level of signification required at least seems to grant the 
Member States significant sovereignty in the matter.215 
Depending on the interpretation of the text in Article 194(2) TFEU, the correct legal 
basis for energy provisions affecting a Member States’ energy rights can be found 
either within the Energy Title or outside of it. If the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU is 
interpreted to cover a prohibition to affect any of the Member States’ energy rights, 
another legal basis for energy provisions needs to be found. The choice of the correct 
legal basis will be addressed next, in section 4.3. In order to provide clarity to a 
complicated pattern of interpretations, appendix 1 illustrates the argumentation 
within section 4.3. The paradigm displayed in the appendix might well be worth a 
glance before commencing the reading of the following sections.  
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4.3 The choice of a legal basis for energy provisions 
4.3.1 Interpretation of the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU 
 
The choice of a legal basis for energy provisions is dependent on the interpretation of 
the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU. If it is determined, that provisions affecting a 
Member State’s energy rights up to a certain level can be based on Article 194(2) 
TFEU, the Energy Title contains the correct legal basis for measures up to a certain 
threshold. For measures affecting the energy rights above the threshold, an 
alternative legal basis must be found for measures with a significant effect. If, 
however, the meaning of the caveat is to restrict all measures affecting a Member 
States energy rights, the legal basis for energy provisions affecting the Member 
States’ energy rights has to be found elsewhere in the TFEU. Because the objectives 
set out in the Article also include the promotion of energy efficiency, energy saving 
and the promotion of new and renewable energy, Vedder suggests that the legal basis 
in the Energy Title also can be used to provide energy provisions specifically aimed 
at environmental objectives.216 Then how are we to determine the legal basis, if the 
boundaries of the energy and environmental primary provisions are undetermined 
and possibly overlapping?  
Because of the wording of Article 194(1) TFEU, which states that the objectives 
need to be carried out ‘with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment’, the decision of the correct legal basis in provisions concerning 
promotion of the development of new and renewable forms of energy is unclear.  In a 
case where the correct legal basis is uncertain, the aim of the measure will probably 
be conclusive when choosing the correct legal basis. In the Republic of Poland v 
Commission the applicant disputed Decision 2011/278/EU determining transitional 
Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to 
Article 10a of Directive 2003/87, which the applicant, among other issues, 
considered an ‘infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 194(2) TFEU, 
read in conjunction with point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU’, 
on the ground that the Commission did not take into account the specificity of each 
                                                




Member State’s energy mix. In the case the Court ruled that “It follows that the right 
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 194(2) TFEU is not applicable in 
the present case, since the contested decision constitutes an action taken by the 
European Union within the framework of its environment policy”.217 In the case the 
General Court conducts that Article 194(2) TFEU is not applicable when the 
provision is adopted in the area of environment and hence the Commission decision 
and the directive did not breach the competence provided by the TFEU.218 This 
means that provisions based on any environmental legal basis can not be disputed 
based on the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU, since the caveat establishes no general 
prohibition to significantly interfere with the choice of the Member State’s choices 
of energy resources in the policy section of environment or any other area.  
Also measures, which are aimed at another sector’s objectives, but have effect on the 
energy market, would have to be based on another provision than Article 194(2) 
TFEU. Article 194(2) TFEU provides the legal basis for legislation necessary to 
reach ‘the objectives in paragraph 1’, which include promotion of ‘energy efficiency 
and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy’. 
Based on this, Article 194(2) could arguably be the basis for a range of 
environmental legislation as well.219 Article 194(2) provides for no alternative legal 
basis for provisions falling outside the scope of the caveat in the Article, whereby 
theoretical speculation is in its place. 
4.3.2 Measures that do not affect a Member State’s energy rights 
 
If the significance threshold of Article 194(2) TFEU is interpreted to consist of a 
total prohibition regarding measures affecting a Member State’s energy rights, any 
measures affecting the Member States’ rights determined in Article 194(2) TFEU, 
can not be adopted based on the Energy Title, but have most probably to be 
conducted under the Environmental Title. Nevertheless, the CJEU has determined 
that Article 194(2) TFEU “constitutes the legal basis for European Union acts which 
are ‘necessary’ to achieve the objectives assigned to that policy by Article 194(1) 
                                                
217 Case T-370/11 Republic of Poland v Commission para 17. 
218 Ibid para 17. 
219 Hancher – Salerno in Biondi – Eeckhout – Ripley 2012, p. 392.  
  
 61 
TFEU”220 What is important to notice is the interaction between Articles 194(2) and 
192(2) TFEU, in which Article 194(2) has a direct referral to point (c) of Article 
192(2) TFEU. Article 194(2) is applicable without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c), 
which directly read means that environmental provisions could affect the energy 
policy, at least to a certain extent. This is also supported by the existing secondary 
legislative body and most prominently in the RE-directive (2009/28), where a certain 
degree of attribution of power to the Union has been agreed upon.221 
It is not clearly stated, what the legal basis for energy measures aimed at reduction of 
greenhouse gases is.  If the reduction of greenhouse gases is only seen as an intended 
consequence of energy saving and energy efficiency the objectives of Article 194(1) 
TFEU, the prominent argument is that Article 194 TFEU is the primary and thus 
correct legal basis, of course depending on the accepted level of significance. If the 
pattern of argumentation however is one of the measures for energy saving and 
energy efficiency having the primary objective of reduction of greenhouse gases and 
the provident use of energy resources, Article 192(2) TFEU would be the primary 
legal base. The scope for the use of Article 194(2) TFEU would thereby be limited to 
matters like energy efficiency and energy savings as well as possibly a certain level 
of promotion of renewable energy. The effect of the promotion of renewable energy 
on the choice of energy resources is although disputed.222 The mere technical 
development of new and renewable forms of energy is however clearly to fall under 
the scope of Article 194(2) TFEU. 
4.3.3 Measures that do affect a Member State’s energy rights  
 
Measures that do affect a Member State’s energy rights can be divided into two sub-
sections: 1) measures, which significantly affect a Member State’s energy rights and 
2) measures, which do affect a Member State’s energy rights, but which do not affect 
the rights significantly. Measures significantly affecting the energy rights of the 
Member States should most probably be based on Article 192(2) TFEU, requiring 
the SLP, whereas measures affecting, but not significantly affecting the national 
                                                
220 Case C-490/10, para. 67. 
221 In Opinion of Advocate General Bot 8.5.2013, in Joined Cases C‑204/12 to C‑208/12 Essent 
Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, para 103, the AG 
refers to the contested Directive 2001/77, where attribution of power also was agreed upon concerning 
the origin of energy, which was to be from renewable energy resources to a certain degree. 
222 See e.g. Haralsdottir 2014. 
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rights should probably be based either on Article 194(4) or on Article 192(1) TFEU, 
depending on the interpretation of the threshold limit in the caveat. According to 
Article 192(2) TFEU, measures concerning the conditions for exploitation of the 
Member State’s energy resources are not governed by the Article, and thus do not 
need to be adopted by unanimous decisions, which indirectly would direct measures 
of this character to fall under the scope of Article 192(1) TFEU. 
 
If the measure interferes with the Member State’s rights according to Article 194(2) 
TFEU, that legal act might not be possible to adopt under Article 194(2) TFEU. If, 
however, one were to argue that the measure on hand was one of energy saving and 
energy efficiency character to be adopted primarily in order to reduce greenhouse 
gases and with the purpose of prudent and rational use of natural resources, the 
right choice for a legal basis should be Article 192(2) TFEU, which requires 
unanimity voting in the Council, in itself a possible barrier to renewable energy 
measures. The choice of the legal basis might depend highly on the primary purpose 
of the provision, and it is hence not excluded that Articles 192(1) and 192(2) TFEU 
could be used.223 If, however, Article 192(2) TFEU is the proper legal basis, 
ambitious measures may be obstructed by the unanimity requirement. Whether the 
fundamental aim of the provision could be used to choose a legal basis and thereby 
bypass the complicated procedure under Article 192(2) TFEU or a similar process 
proscribed under Article 194(2) TFEU, requiring a unanimous decision by the 
council, is debated. In favour of this solution is Vedder, who however notes that it 
would be ‘an institutional oddity’, if a measure of e.g. energy-related taxation could 
be subject of a different legislative process than an energy measure – if presented as 
an environmental issue.224  
 
One of the problems with the interrelated provisions is also the possible occurrence 
of spill over effect, as the boundaries for Articles 192 and 194 TFEU are not clear. 
225 Since there is no clear reference to Article 192(1) in Article 194 TFEU, it is 
unclear whether measures primarily aimed at the mitigation of climate change and 
                                                
223 Peeters 2014, p. 46. 
224 See Vedder 2010, p. 294. 
225 The spill over effect is identified as a core theory of European integration. (See more in Haas, 




concerning renewable energy which do affect, but do not significantly affect the 
Members States choice can be adopted based on Article 192(1) TFEU, conducted 
under the ordinary legislative procedure.  
 
What would then speak for the use of Article 192(1) TFEU as the correct legal basis, 
and in which situations? Fouquet – Nysten - Johnston argue that the focus in this 
question should be on the wording of the Articles on hand. Article 194 mentions only 
the ‘development’ of new and renewable energy forms of energy, which, according 
to the specific wording could refer only to technological development, such as 
technological standards.226 According to this interpretation Article 194 does not at all 
refer to increase in diffusion. Whether the wording includes the possibility to 
promotion of renewable energy at all is questionable, and Fouquet et al. argue that 
this leaves room for the use of Article 192(1) TFEU in the promotion of renewable 
energy.227  It has been argued that Article 194(2) TFEU only leaves room for 
technical development of aspects of renewable energy228, whereby the application of 
Article 194(1) TFEU in the promotion of renewable energy would be plausible. 
 
Article 194(2) TFEU prohibits the EU to adopt measures affecting the Member 
States’ rights to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, but 
contrary to the mentioning of the choice between different energy sources and the 
structure of the Member State’s energy supply, the conditions for exploitation of 
energy resources is not mentioned in the referred Article 192(2) TFEU. This would 
supposedly mean that the Council could adopt measures concerning the exploitation 
of Member States’ energy resources acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure. 
 
                                                
226 SRU, German Advisory Council on the Environment, Pathways towards a 100% renewable 
electricity system, Special Report 2011, p. 180. Available at 
http://www.umweltrat.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/02_Special_Reports/2011_10_Special_Report_
Pathways_renewables.html (3.1.2016). 
227 Fouquet – Nysten – Johnston 2012, p 12. 
228 SRU, German Advisory Council on the Environment, Pathways towards a 100% renewable 





4.4 The use of another legal basis 
4.4.1 Lex specialis  
 
Could energy provisions listed in Article 194 TFEU be based on another legal basis 
than the Energy Title or the Environmental Title? According to the European courts 
two other provisions have prevailed and can be considered lex specialis in relation to 
Article 194(2) TFEU. Since Article 194(2) TFEU is applied “without prejudice to the 
application of other provisions of the Treaties”, certain other provisions continue to 
apply to the energy sector. The applicable provisions are Article 122 TFEU, which 
authorizes the Council to adopt appropriate measures in the case of a crisis in the 
supply of products in the energy sector, and Article 170 TFEU concerning the 
development of trans-European networks in the energy infrastructure sector. These 
two provisions can under lex specialis be applied even though the measures at hand 
are aimed at pursuing the objectives stated in 194(1).229 Especially Article 122 could 
be momentous if provisions fail to pass the unity requirement of Article 192(2) 
through Article 194(2) TFEU, and the situation is of force majeure character.  In 
order to reach the pressing environmental objectives, could maybe this Article be the 
solution?  
 
Even in the event of an energy crisis the Union cannot infringe on the rights of the 
Member States by usurping the functions of national governments.230 Measures of 
preventative character can, however, be carried out based on Article 122. The 
determination of preventative measures might be a problem, but the situations 
considered crisis situations should entail “grave danger to vital interests, if not its 
very existence, of a Member State”.231 The situations of applicability are thus ever so 
few. Article 122 TFEU nevertheless delegates the decision-making power to the 
Council on Commission proposals and therefore excludes the Parliament from the 
process, a way of decision-making very different from Article 194(2) TFEU. 
 
                                                
229 See case C-490/10 Parliament v Council para 67. 
230 Declaration N° 35 annexed to the Final Act (OJ 2007/C 306/02 p. 261, Declaration 35). 
231 Haghighi 2008, p. 471. 
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The internal market Article in 114 TFEU has the intention of harmonization of the 
free movement of goods, persons, service and capital. The Article postulates ordinary 
legislative procedure, and the current RE- directive is partially based on this 
Article.232 Again, the main purpose of the provision should determine the legal basis, 
and if the energy measure aims at an internal market concern, it could possibly fall 
within the scope of Article 114.233 So far, no other provisions have prevailed as 
superior to Article 194(2). 
 
4.4.2 The use of a dual legal basis 
 
‘[B]y way of exception, if it is established that the measure simultaneously pursues 
several objectives which are inseparably linked without one being secondary an 
indirect in relation to the other, the measure may be founded on the corresponding 
legal bases’.234 The use of multiple legal bases is involuntarily when ‘the act 
simultaneously pursues a number of objectives or has several components that are 
indivisibly linked’.235 If the separate legal bases prescribe the same legal process, 
there should be no complications in the legislative process, but should the 
combination of legal bases lead to different and mutually inconsistent procedures, 
one appropriate legal basis must be chosen.236 It has also been proposed that the 
procedural requirements of both Articles must be satisfied,237 which means that the 
‘more demanding’ procedure must be followed, and in addition, any requirements of 
the less demanding procedure must be included in the procedure.238  
 
                                                
232 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, paras 17-19. 
233 Peeters 2014, p. 48. 
234 Opinion 2/00 of the Court of Justice 6 December 2001. See, to that effect, Case C-300/89, 
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, (the Titanium 
Dioxide judgement) paras 13 and 17, and case C-42/97, Parliament v Council, para 38. 
235 Case C-94/03, Commission v Council, para 47. 
236 Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco 10 December 
2002. The judgement states that “[i]f examination of a Community act shows that it has a twofold 
purpose or twofold component and if one of these is identifiable as main or predominant, whereas the 
other is merely incidental, the act must be founded on a sole legal basis, that is, the one required by 
the main or predominant purpose or component”…”[e]xceptionally, if it is established that the act 
simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, indissociably linked, without one being secondary and 
indirect in relation to the other, such an act may be founded on the various corresponding legal bases”, 
para 94. 
237 Hartley 2010, p. 119. 
238 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 78. 
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In the context of renewable energy promotion, Article 194(2) TFEU interacts both 
with Article 192 and 107(3) TFEU, as well as possibly many others. For example 
Article 107(3) TFEU allocates state aid239, and support schemes are considered 
requisite in order to enhance renewable energy promotion within the EU. 240 
Combinations of Articles 192(1) and 114 TFEU are also supposedly possible. 
Whether an interaction between Articles 194(2) and 107(3) TFEU is possible is to be 
seen.  
 
4.4.3 The legal basis – an intended choice? 
 
The logical question based on the above presented: can the legal basis actually be an 
intended choice steered by the fundamental aim of the measure? Of what use is the 
caveat in 194(2) TFEU if the attribution of powers to the Union due to secondary 
provisions already significantly have infringed upon the Member States’ energy 
rights and the rest of all energy measures can be aimed as environmental or other 
provisions? Can the aim of the measure really overrule the underlying intention and 
effects in order to dodge the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU? The CJEU partially 
contradicts the disguising of provisions by arguing that “[a]ccording to settled 
case‑law, the choice of the legal basis for a European Union measure must rest on 
objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, 241 including in particular 
the purpose and the content of that measure.”242 According to Jans – Vedder, this 
means that the legislator is not free to choose a legal basis, but is obliged to test the 
‘centre of gravity’ of the measure.243 As stated, if a secondary provision is not based 
on the energy provision, it cannot either be contested in the light of this. The 
conclusion would be that the effect of the provision should be carefully considered 
and legally based according to the purpose and effect.  
                                                
239 State aid is by the European Commission specified as ”aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such state aid does not adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contributary to the common interest” and considered that ”[w]ell-
designed public support measures can make a key contribution to achieving the EU’s energy and 
climate objectives for 2020”. European Commission Press Release, State Aid: Commission consults 
on draft rules for State support in energy and environmental field, IP/13/1282, Brussels 18 December 
2013, p 1. 
240 Sveens 2014, p. 176. 
241 Italics added by author. 
242 Case 45/86 Commission v. Council, ruling of 26 March 1987 ECR 1439, para 2. 
243 Jans – Vedder 2012, p. 77. 
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The European legislator should carefully consider the principle of proportionality in 
order to avoid provisions with disconnected aim and effect, in order to observe the 
Treaties. Evaluation pursuant to the principle of proportionality according to the case 
law of the CJEU is based on a tripartite test. First, one has to evaluate, whether the 
measure is appropriate to reach the objectives of the measure (the test of 
sustainability). Secondly, one has to assess whether the measure is the least 
restrictive alternative (the least restrictive alternative) and thirdly, one has to evaluate 
whether the disadvantages are proportionate in relation to the objective 
(proportionality stricto sensu).244 A measure can, however, be regarded adverse to 
the principle of proportionality only if it is obviously inappropriate in relation to its 
objective. 245  In the considered Republic of Poland v Commission case, the 
proportionality of the measure could be disputed, if presented in a slightly different 
manner, but I doubt that the allocation of emission allowances would constitute 
“significant” effect on a Member State’s energy mix. Emission allowances after all 
leave a versatile choice of energy sources, which for the example the RE-directive 
does not. Concerning the RE-directive, among others Talus argues that the Directive 
seems to have been adopted on a incorrect legal basis, since it was adopted with a 
majority instead of unanimity, when adopted based on TEC 175(1), now 192(1) 
TFEU. 246 All Member States were although in favour of adopting the directive, 
whereby the legal basis only can be faulted hypothetically. The directive was 
furthermore adopted by unanimity.247 
Even though the environmental objectives demand a decrease in fossil fuels, the 
provisions regulating future energy matters might be provided with more general 
objectives for the Member States, based on environmental provisions. As stated 
earlier in the text, the integration principle has a steering attribute, according to 
which environmental objectives must be taken into consideration when providing 
secondary legislation, which would speak for the possible use of the environmental 
primary provisions as legal bases for environmentally aimed energy provisions. 
An important question is whether adoption of a measure based on an improper legal 
                                                
244 The balancing and weighing according to the tripartite test appears e.g. in joined cases C-27/00 and 
C-122/00 , ruling of 12  March 2002, Omega Air, point 62. 
245 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p. 56. 
246 Talus (2014(a)), p. 181. 
247 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 2008/0016 (COD), Brussels, 6 April 2009. 
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basis can cause annulation of the measure. According to the CJEU, a measure might 
be annulled for being adopted on the wrong legal basis if this affects “the rules of the 
Treaty on the forming of the Council’s decisions” or “the division of powers between 
the institutions”248. The latter could surely be a reason for complaint if the energy 
provision is provided on the wrong legal basis. If a wrongfully based measure would 
interfere with for example the voting procedure or the division of powers between 
the institutions within the Union, the measure could be annulled,249 and the same 
should be applicable if a measure interferes with powers granted the Member States. 
Due to a possibility of the interference with the required legislative process for a 
certain type of measure possibly leading to annulation, an eschew of the special 
legislative process in energy matters, required in 192(2)(c) TFEU, could prove 
unplayable. 
Hence, to imply that the legal basis is an intended choice is inaccurate.  The aim of 
the measure is the ultimate element, upon which the choice of the legal basis must be 
based. The predominant purpose of the measure is the guiding line to be followed. 
4.4.4 Passerelle clause 
 
The second paragraph of Article 192(2) TFEU states:   
 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, may make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to 
the matters referred to in the first subparagraph. 
 
According to the provision, the Council may unanimously decide that another 
process of decision-making applies to the issue falling under Article 192(2) TFEU. 
The article incudes requirement for unanimity voting for certain sectors, which are 
regarded as sensitive to alterations. These are ‘provisions primarily of fiscal nature’, 
‘measures affecting town and country planning, quantitative management of water 
resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the availability of these resources, and 
land use, with the exception of waste management’ as well as, finally, ‘measures 
                                                
248 Case 8-73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson GmbH, para 4. 
249 Hartley 2010, p. 119. 
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significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply’.  Another possible solution to the possible 
problem of the unanimity requirement, could it be the passerelle clause?  
 
A passerelle clause empowers the European Council to surpass the special legislative 
procedure by applying the ordinary legislative procedure by implying the 
introduction of qualified majority voting instead of unanimity, thereby placing the 
Parliament on an equal level.250 The use of a passerelle clause is only applicable if 
no opposition from national parliaments is raised. Due to the extremely resolute 
wording of TFEU 192(2) TFEU, the possibility of application of the passerelle 
clause is indefinite, and calls for closer analysis of the boundaries of the possibly 
applicable exception. The use of “a  ‘passerelle’ that enables the Council 
unanimously to decide that another decision-making procedure applies (Article 
192(2), last paragraph TFEU)” has been considered by Jans – Vedder, who are in 
favour of the use of passerelle clauses also in relation to Article 194(2) TFEU.251 
 
 




The energy powers are gradually shifting to the Union at an increasing level due to 
the extensive and continually growing secondary legislative body. It is visible from 
the drafting stages of the Lisbon Treaty that the Member States of the Union sought 
to retain the powers concerning the basic energy rights, which not yet had been 
obtained by the Union by the providing of secondary legislation. The placement of 
the Energy Title in the field of the internal market was expected, although the 
wording did result in the possibility of causing problems from the point of view of 
the vertical division of powers in external energy matters. The exclusion of an 
external energy competence might therefore be the greatest problem in the vertical 
division of powers of the EU. The steering of the field of energy into the scope of the 
environmental sphere of the Union’s policies is a positive and ample clarification of 
one of the fundamental aims of the Union.  
                                                
250 De Sadeleer 2014 p. 153. 




One of the central objectives of the European Union as to the energy policy – and 
maybe the most prominent challenge – is the objective of ‘speaking with one voice’. 
As argued by Talus, the secondary body of legislation existing before the 
introduction of the Energy Title does clearly broaden the scope of the primary energy 
provisions252, which the CJEU might adduce in case of an appeal regarding the legal 
basis of an energy provision. The premises for the EU primary energy provisions 
should however fundamentally be the same as the environmental cogitation overall – 
the pursuit of sustainable development.  
 
The correct interpretation of the scope of the caveat in Article 194(2) TFEU is still 
uncertain. If the scope of the caveat is largely determined by the extent of the 
existing secondary legislative body, a threshold might well be used in the 
interpretation of Article 194(2) TFEU. In that case, the correct legal basis for energy 
provisions slightly affecting the Member States’ energy rights is found Article 
194(2), and the correct legal basis is found Article 194(2) TFEU for energy 
provisions significantly affecting the energy rights. Either the institutions or the 
CJEU could possibly rule that the wording of Article 194(2) TFEU, “[s]uch 
measures shall not affect” should be interpreted ‘such measures shall not 
significantly affect’, which would considerably widen the scope of using Article 
194(2) TFEU as a legal basis. If no minimum threshold is determined for the level of 
significance of the effect on the Member States energy rights under Article 194(2) 
TFEU, it seems that the scope for the use of the Energy Title as a legal basis is 
minimal. It is thereby possible that the EU cannot provide provisions affecting a 
Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, 
its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply under the Energy Title. Presented and based under the Environmental Title, 
measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply could then be adopted by the 
special legislative procedure. Also measures affecting but not significantly affecting 
the Member States’ energy rights could be adopted by the ordinary legislative 
procedure based on the environmental provisions, whereas any provisions affecting 
                                                
252 Talus 2008, p. 641-642. 
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the energy rights could not at all be based on the Energy Title. This interpretation 
would substantially limit the applicability of the Energy Title and result in the 
Energy Title having a rather limited applicability as a legal basis overall.  
 
Then why introduce the Energy Title? Regardless of any interpretation of the caveat, 
the importance of the introduction of the Energy Title will not be reduced. The 
apprehension of most scholars that the introduction of the Energy Title merely was a 
clarification to the status quo is probably correct. No significant alternations to the 
division of powers were introduced. The direct reference in the Energy Title to the 
Environmental Title steers energy matters clearly into an environmental context, and 
the specification of the SLP to quite likely in any case concern matters significantly 
affecting a Member State’s energy rights could promote the national powers of the 
Member States. As a conclusion, it seems that the EU has no competence in 
measures of non-environmental character that affect the Member States’ energy 
rights, which can only be positive for the environment and sustainable development. 
 
As the legislative body of energy provisions of the Union grows, the scope of the 
energy rights of the Member States diminishes. The inclusion of the caveat in Article 
194(2) TFEU is therefore justified as the most extensive possible shield against 
Union powers, as the Member States are reluctant to shift the fundamental energy 
competences to the Union. A gradual shift of the power to the Union in energy 
matters is justified from the point of view of the climate objectives, and the 
reluctance of the Member States to fully do so displays possible problematic aspects 
from an environmental point of view and from the point of view of satisfying the 
requirements of the integration principle. It is although likely that small steps in 
measures from the EU will gradually reduce the Member States’ energy rights and 
thereby the scope of action for the separate states to a minimum.253 The caveat in 
Article 194(2) in relation to Article 192(2)(c) TFEU is designed to work in a duplex 
way. If the institutions manage to determine certain frameworks for the level of 
significance of impact on the Member States’ energy rights, the determination of the 
scope in the CJEU might never need to occur. If, however, the Union institutions 
                                                
253 Pielow – Lewendel in Delvaux – Hunt – Talus 2012, p. 269. The expression used by the authors is 




propose measures that have a significant impact on certain Member States energy 
rights, the provisions might fail in the SPL or lose their significance due to an opt-out 
clause. If provisions based on Article 192(1) TFEU come out as too restricting on a 
certain Member State’s energy rights after having entered into force, the inaccurate 
legal basis can be a ground for appeal, when at latest the level of significance of EU 
energy measures would be determined. The possible inclusion of an undetermined 
level of signification would however show a certain will from the Member States to 
contribute to the mitigation of climate changes by energy measures aimed at the 
environmental objectives. On the other hand, there have been cases at the CJEU 
where the legal basis has been faulted because of the infringement on Member 
States’ energy rights, which increases the possibility for similar processes in the 
future. 
 
Even a broad interpretation of the Energy Title or an expansion of powers for the 
Union in energy policy does not necessarily guarantee the full-scale application of 
the principle of integration. Further development of environmental, climate- and 
energy policies should, in my opinion, be performed within a common framework, 
which would allow catering for all the complexities in these sectors. The separation 
and separate consideration of these sectors is indecorous. Steps of better integration 
of the areas are necessary for sufficient progress. Whatever the final interpretation of 
the scope of Article 194(2) TFEU is, the legislative process falling under the scope 
will be somewhat difficult. The determination of the legal basis for renewable energy 
matters is yet to be conducted, but it appears to require an in casu evaluation, since 
the TFEU does not provide a direct answer. This will, however, be determined within 
the institutional work or in case law and does surely not constitute a problem, 
although it did provide a basis for interesting contemplation. 
 
It is also worth to remark that a characteristic of EU energy policy is flexibility. As 
to the alternations to the scope of energy competences introduced by the Energy 
Title, the conclusion is that the introduction solely includes a codification of pre-
Lisbon status quo. The only widening of competences visible is the possibility to 
promotion of technical development of renewable energy sources within the scope of 
Article 194(2) TFEU. The significance of the introduction of the Energy Title is 
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uppermost of political value,254 and a great step towards providing the basis for a 
common energy policy. One thing that can explain many of the exaggerated concerns 
about Article 194(2) TFEU might be that the interpretation could have been taken 
out of context. The interpretation of the caveat includes so much more than the mere 
text of the Article. The political side, which has been featured slightly also in this 
text, will most likely play a crucial part in the determination of the today 
undetermined issues.  As also Guimaraes-Purokoski has stated, the possibility that 
the legal basis in the Energy Title is designated to have a rather limited applicability 
is a non-consistent solution.255  
 
Neither the one extremity proposed above in 4.2.2, concerning the caveat in Article 
194(2) TFEU being merely a façade, nor the other extremity proposed where the 
caveat is seen as a spoke in the Union’s wheels, seems plausible. So, can the Energy 
Title halt the decision-making process? The answer is no, providing of energy 
provisions of all forms is a matter of political will, and the boundaries of the scope 
have to be determined in time, and for all I know, might already have been 
determined within the European institutions, not showing outwards. The providing of 
energy provisions will be a balancing and weighing between different objectives and 
the European legislator’s predominant purpose will most likely be an environmental 
one, according to all the signs. 
 
As a result, and as processed widely in the text, the Energy Title in itself is not the 
problem for forming a serious energy policy and promoting renewable energy. The 
possibilities for the external energy policy will clarify in time, and so will the 
accurate legal basis for energy provisions of all forms. If anything, it is the special 
legislative process in Article 192(2) TFEU or some kind of opt-out clause that can 
retard the providing of ambitious environmentally aimed energy provisions. The 
most prominent problem with the introduction of the Energy Title might well be the 
plausible overlaps in the horizontal competence of the Union and the determination 
of the correct legal basis instead of the expected results of proving problems in the 
                                                
254 SRU, German Advisory Council on the Environment, Pathways towards a 100% renewable 
electricity system, Special Report 2011, p 186. Available at: 
http://www.umweltrat.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/02_Special_Reports/2011_10_Special_Report_
Pathways_renewables.html (3.1.2016). 
255 Guimaraes-Purokoski 2009, p 196. 
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vertical division of powers. The results of the research were surprising since most 
focus regarding the introduction of the Energy Title has been on the determination of 
the possible alternation the vertical division of powers.  
 
An underlying undertaking of the text was to investigate the realisation of the 
principle of integration in the Energy Title. A direct answer is difficult to provide 
because of the many aspects to the energy provisions, but overall the conclusion is 
that the integration principle is well materialised in the Treaty energy provisions, 256 
and the implementation is only depending on political will.  The fact that the Energy 
Title likely steers the majority of secondary energy provisions to be provided within 
the scope of the environmental provisions and the aim to provide the provisions with 
a legal basis in the Energy Title ‘with regard for the need to preserve and improve 






















                                                
256 Dupont – Primova in Tosun Jale – Solorio, Israel (eds.) 2011 and Dupont – Oberthür 2012 argue 
that the post-Lisbon competences in energy policy do not provide sufficient tools for EPI, but this is 
disputable. The tools are sufficient, but the political will is vital, and measuring of the political will is 
difficult. This is observed by Dupont – Primova 2011, p. 4 and 5-6, but not sufficiently taken into 










1) The caveat includes a 
threshold, allowing measures 
up to a certain level of effect 
on Member States’ energy 
rights to be provided under 
Article 194(2) TFEU. 
2) The caveat is interpreted 
according to its wording, 
whereby no measures affecting 
the Member States’ energy 
rights can be provided under 
Article 194(2) TFEU. 
Measures with significant 
effect require either a 
possibility to an opt-out 
clause, a possibility of veto or 
the use of the  SLP.  Measures 
with significant effect are 
possibly to be provided under 















to a certain 
level of 
significanca-
tion (yet to 
be 
determined) 





Certain measures affecting the 
Member States’ energy rights 
can be provided under Article 
194(2) TFEU. 
